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ABSTRACT: On January 4, 2016, over 100 women lawyers, law professors, and
former judges told the world that they had had an abortion. In a daring amicus
brief filed in Whole Woman 's Health v. Hellerstedt, the women spoke publicly
about one of the most private decisions a woman can make. Their participation
in this brief, which captured national media attention, marked their "coming out"
to their clients and to all of their former, present, and future supervisors and col-
leagues; to the judges for whom they have clerked; and to the Justices of the
Supreme Court.
The past three years have seen an explosion of such "voices briefs." Sixteen
were filed in Obergefell v. Hodges alone and seventeen were filed in Whole
Woman's Health. These briefs can be powerful, but their use is controversial.
They tell the stories of non-parties-strangers to the appellate case-with no vet-
ting by cross examination or the rules of evidence. Yet, despite their unconven-
tional nature, they have thus far received little academic attention.
The time has come to ask some tough questions: Are these briefs legally
permissible? Theoretically legitimate? How do they compare with other sources
consulted regularly by the Court, including factual internet research performed
by judges themselves and experiments orchestrated in chambers? Are they really
so different from the policy arguments we have accepted without blinking for
over a hundred years?
These foundational questions quickly take us into even murkier waters-
legal and constitutional theory; narrative theory; framing; and cognitive science.
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Voices briefs prompt us to look at constitutional decision making in a new way.
Soon we find that voices briefs are interrogating long-accepted assumptions ra-
ther than the other way around. The analysis produces some surprising reasons
why voices briefs can play an important role in constitutional interpretation and
some realistic ideas about handling the undeniable concerns that still haunt their
use.
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INTRODUCTION
On January 4, 2016, more than 100 women lawyers, law students, law pro-
fessors, and former judges filed an amicus brief in Whole Woman 's Health v.
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Hellerstedt.' The brief received immediate national attention.2 In it, these women
told the world, perhaps for the first time, that they had had an abortion.
The women spoke publicly about one of the most private decisions a woman
can make. The brief marks their "coming out" to their clients; to all of their for-
mer, present, and future supervisors and colleagues; and to the judges before
whom they will appear or for whom they have clerked. But the brief is more than
a disclosure to the wide world. These women are speaking directly and person-
ally from inside the Justices' own rhetorical circle. As one of the brief's authors
explained: "It's the Justices' community-it's their colleagues and people who
have argued before them and former law school classmates and co-clerks." The
Justices would recognize many of the names in the brief's ten-page list of signa-
tories.
The brief shares the women's stories. A woman who has argued multiple
cases before the Court described two medically dangerous pregnancies, telling
the Court that its decisions protecting her right to choose had been indispensable
to her life, both as an attorney and as a wife and mother.4 A former clerk for the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals described her situation at age twenty-two, when
she was studying to apply to law school and found herself pregnant after a con-
traception failure. She was single and waiting tables for a living.' A litigation
partner at a large law firm explained that her abortion as a teenager had given her
"the ability to be the first person in my family to graduate from high school, the
first person to graduate from college, and the first person to achieve a post-grad-
uate degree."6 A law professor described being seventeen years old, pregnant,
and desperate. At that young age, she kept coming back to only two options: self-
abortion by clothes-hanger or suicide.7 The overarching theme of all these stories
1. Brief of MacAvoy et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Whole Woman's Health v.
Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (No. 15-274), 2016 WL 74949. The amici were headed by Janice
MacAvoy, a partner at the New York office of Fried Frank, see Janice Mac Avoy Biography, FRIED
FRANK, http://www.friedfrank.com/index.cfm?pagelD=42&itemID-425, and Janie Schulman, a partner
at the Los Angeles office of Morrison & Foerster, see Janie F. Schulman: Overview, MORRISON
FoERSTER, http://www.mofo.com/people/s/schulman-janie-f.
2. See e.g., Adam Liptak, Eyes on Kennedy, Women Tell Supreme Court Why Abortion Was Right
for Them, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/01/us/politics/abortion-su-
preme-court-women-explain-choices.html?hp&action-click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-
heading&module=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav-top-news&_r-0; Ruth Marcus, In a
Supreme Court Brief Lawyers Bravely Tell Their Own Abortion Stories, WASH. POST (Jan. 26, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/in-a-supreme-court-brief-lawyers-tell-their-own-abortion-
stories/2016/01/26/19c41Ofa-c457-1 1e5-a4aa-f25866baOdc6_story.html.
3. Marcus, supra note 2 (quoting Alexia Korberg of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison
LLP).
4. Brief of MacAvoy et al., supra note 1, at 32.
5. Id. at 15-17.
6. Id. at 10-11.
7. Id. at 23.
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is that without reproductive choice, women-these women-could not have par-
ticipated fully in the same professional community in which the Justices have
lived and thrived.8
Though among the bravest, this brief was not the first "voices brief'9 relating
stories of individuals who were strangers to the appellate case. The first such
brief was filed in 1986,10 but until recently, they were rare." Times have
changed, however. Obergefell v. Hodges2 brought an explosion of amicus filers
telling their own stories. A total of sixteen voices briefs were filed in that case
alone.1 3 And the phenomenon continues. After the dust settled in Whole
Woman 's Health v. Hellerstedt,14 seventeen briefs had related stories of non-par-
ties." On deeply personal constitutional issues such as marriage equality and
reproductive rights, voices briefs are now de rigueur.
These briefs can be powerful, even heart-wrenching, but their use has so far
received little academic attention.16 The time has come to take them seriously,
and that means asking some tough questions: Are they legally permissible? The-
oretically legitimate? How do they compare with other sources consulted by ap-
pellate courts, including internet explorations performed by judges at their own
computers? Are voices briefs really so different from the policy arguments we
have accepted without blinking for over a hundred years?'7 These foundational
questions quickly take us into even deeper waters-legal theory, traditional
forms of legal reasoning, narrative theory, framing, and cognitive science.
8. One sentence sums up the briefs message: "To the world, I am an attorney who had an abortion,
and, to myself, I am an attorney because I had an abortion." Id. at 3.
9. Ruth Petchesky was among the first to discuss the phenomenon of voices briefs. Rosalind Pollack
Petchesky, Amicus Brief Richard Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 3, 4-5 (1986). Robin West also wrote of "voices briefs." See Robin L. West, Tak-
ing Freedom Seriously, 104 HARv. L. REv. 43, 82 n.174 (1990); see also Nancy Levit, Theorizing and
Litigating the Rights ofSexual Minorities, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 21, 40 (2010).
10. The first voices brief was filed in Thornburgh v. American College ofObstetricians & Gyne-
cologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986). It was followed by two briefs filed in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), one on each side of the issue, and by another on the pro-life side in Gon-
zales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). See Appendix. See generally Linda H. Edwards, Hearing Voices:
Non-Party Stories in Abortion and Gay Rights Advocacy, 2015 MiCH. ST. L. REv. 1327.
11. Only four voices briefs had been filed over a span of twenty-five years. Then four more were
filed in just the two years of 2011 and 2012, perhaps signaling a tipping point. These four briefs included
three in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012), and another in
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). See Appendix.
12. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
13. See Appendix.
14. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
15. See Appendix.
16. Ruth Petchesky pointed out and praised the original voices brief. Petchesky, supra note 9. A
few other articles have referred to these briefs while making other interesting points. See e.g., Ruth Colker,
Feminist Litigation: An Oxymoron?-A Study of the Briefs Filed in William L. Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 137 (1990) (analyzing the arguments in Webster from a feminist
perspective); Nancy Levit, supra note 9, at 22-23, 33 (pointing out the need for litigators to develop nar-
ratives with which courts and wider audiencies can personally identify). None has yet analyzed the legit-
imacy of the phenomenon itself.
17. Policy arguments based on social science have been accepted forms of argument since the iconic
"Brandeis Brief' filed in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). See discussion infra Part II.
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Voices briefs prompt us to look at constitutional deliberation in a new way. Soon
we find that voices briefs are interrogating long-accepted assumptions rather than
the other way around.
This Article argues that voices briefs continue a legitimate tradition of citi-
zen input on issues before the Court. This is not to say that constitutional deci-
sions should be made either by polling citizens or by emotional reactions to tear-
ful stories. Far from it. But neither should they be made in a hermetically sealed
environment-a sterile setting uncontaminated by input from the very citizens
whose lives will be profoundly shaped by the Court's decisions. There is little to
lose and much to gain by allowing amicus filers to share their stories.
Parts I through III of this Article set these questions in their relevant context.
Part I examines how voices briefs have been used. It questions whether they are
as radically new, at least in function, as they first appear. Continuing that ques-
tion, Parts II and III explore the Court's surprisingly unfettered use of non-record
material, arguing that voices briefs differ little from these non-record sources
long and freely used by the Court.
Having established the relevant context, the Article then places voices briefs
within it. Part IV examines the cognitive and behavioral science of how voices
briefs seek to persuade. The science shows that, far from introducing bias to a
neutral process, voices briefs may be the only way to counter the preexisting
values bias that accompanies human deliberation. In fact, stories may encourage
a values-committed decision maker to rely more, not less, on traditional merits
reasoning.
Further, as Part V argues, it is not only the parties who will learn whether
they can marry the person they love or whether they will have control over their
own bodies. Voices briefs provide nonparties a crucial right to be heard on deeply
personal questions that will decide their own futures. And irrespective of out-
come, voices briefs can encourage the Court to write opinions that respect and
value all sides of an issue, thus modeling better public discourse in today's po-
larized public square.
Voices briefs may serve all of these important practical functions, but do
they run afoul of commonly accepted legal theories or principles of constitutional
interpretation? Part VI argues that they do not. But that is not to say that voices
briefs prompt no misgivings. Part VII recognizes some understandable concerns
and proposes normative practices to improve the briefs' reliability and utility.
I. VOICES BRIEFS
Amicus briefing has long been an accepted practice in the Supreme Court,18
but in the modern era, amicus filings have increased dramatically. One scholar
18. For the history and current practice ofamicus filings in the Supreme Court, see generally Helen
A. Anderson, Frenemies ofthe Court: The Many Faces ofAmicus Curiae, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 361 (2014-
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documented an astounding 800% increase in a span of fifty years.1 9 The record
in United States v. Windsor20 included seventy-nine amicus briefs.21 Whole
Woman 's Health v. Hellerstedt22 saw 86 amicus briefs.23 In perhaps the apex to
date, Obergefell v. Hodges24 produced 144 amicus briefs.25 The vibrancy of this
amicus practice reflects an increased desire for connection between the Court
and those it governs. Voices briefs-a new form of amicus advocacy-may be
among the most telling signs of these democratic pressures. It is time for a closer
look at these voices briefs.
A. What Are Voices Briefs?
Voices briefs relate stories drawn from the lives of individuals who are
strangers to the case. These stories appear for the first time on appeal, sidestep-
ping trial court evidentiary standards. They introduce the Court to some of the
individuals who have lived the issues firsthand. For example, the first voices
brief, filed in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecol-
ogists,26 explained the stories and introduced the speakers:
As part of this action, people wrote letters describing why they or people
they knew chose to have abortions. The letters came from people from
all walks of life. Many writers described themselves in their letters:
I am a Christian. I have a college degree and am a registered nurse.
I am a 32 year old Black female. I am a Baptist by faith ....
I was a nice Irish Catholic girl dating a nice Irish boy from Queens.
I was born in Puerto Rico, and I grew up and went to school
there ....
2015); Michael J. Harris, Amicus Curiae: Friend or Foe? The Limits of Friendship in American Jurispru-
dence, 5 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADvoc. 1 (2000); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The
Influence ofAmicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743 (2000); Samuel Krislov,
The Amicus Curiae Brief From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J. 694 (1963); Allison Orr Larsen,
The Trouble with Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L REv. 1757, 1765-1768 (2014).
19. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 18, at 752 (noting that the filing of Supreme Court amicus briefs
has increased by 800% over fifty years).
20. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
21. United States v. Windsor, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/wind-
sor-v-united-states-2/.
22. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
23. Whole Woman s Health v. Hellerstedt, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/whole-womans-health-v-cole/.
24. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
25. Obergefell v. Hodges, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/obergefell-
v-hodges/.
26. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
34 [Vol. 29:29
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I have been married 38 years; I am the mother of 5 wanted and thor-
oughly loved children and grandmother of 3 . ..
On some issues, Justices' need for this kind of introduction may be signifi-
cant. Consider, for example, the widely reported conversation between Justice
Powell and one of his clerks during the pendency of Bowers v. Hardwick, a case
involving the constitutionality of a Georgia sodomy law criminalizing oral and
anal sex in private between consenting adults.2 8 Justice Powell, the crucial and
vacillating swing vote in the case, sought out one of his law clerks to discuss the
case. 29 He told the clerk that he did not think he had ever met a homosexual.3 0
Powell "was struggling to understand a phenomenon totally alien to him." 3 1 He
asked why gay men did not date and marry women.32 When the clerk explained
that many gay men could not achieve an erection during intimate contact with a
woman, Powell was confused because sodomy requires an erection.33 The clerk
had to explain that gay men do achieve erections during sexual contact with
men.34 Describing the conversation, the clerk recalls, "What struck me .... is
that the concept of homosexuality had no content for him. He had no frame of
reference."35
The irony, of course, was that the law clerk to whom Justice Powell was
speaking was a gay man.36 In fact, Justice Powell had hired many gay clerks in
the past.37 But because most gay men were closeted, Powell had little way to
understand homosexuality on a human level.38 Ultimately, Powell provided the
fifth vote for the opinion that refused to recognize a right to privacy for intimate
sexual contact occurring at home between consenting adults.39
27. Brief for the National Abortion Rights Action League et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Ap-
pellees at 5-6, Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (Nos. 84-495,
84-1379), 1985 WL 669630 [hereinafter NARAL Brief] (citations omitted). The brief is reprinted in Pet-
chesky, supra note 9.
28. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
29. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 521-24 (1994).
30. Id. at 521; Debra Cassen Weiss, Justice Who Said He Never Met A Homosexual Actually Had
Several Gay Clerks, A.B.A. J. (June 10, 2013), http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/jus-
tice who saidhenevermet a homosexual-actually-hadseveral-gay_1awscle/.
31. JOYCE MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS V. THE SUPREME
COURT 273 (2001).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 274.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 272.
37. Id. at 272, 275.
38. JEFFRIES, supra note 29, at 521. Subsequently, Justice Powell regretted his decision to be the
majority's fifth vote. When asked about the Bowers v. Hardwick decision four years later, he said, "I think
I probably made a mistake in that one." Id. at 530. Had Justice Powell made a different choice, the right
to privacy in intimate relationships would have been established in 1986, seventeen years before Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
39. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding the Georgia sodomy law).
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That kind of well-intentioned naivet6 can limit the worldview of good people
like Justice Powell, for it is a common human characteristic to associate primar-
ily with and listen primarily to those we perceive to be like us. That cultural
tendency increasingly operates in today's polarized public debates.40 Recently,
for example, Linda Greenhouse reported a conversation with the late Justice
Scalia in which he said that he got his news from the car radio and from skim-
ming two conservative newspapers. He said that he had stopped reading the
Washington Post because it had become too liberal.4 1 The point here is not to
criticize either Justice Powell or Justice Scalia. In this age of MSNBC and Fox
News, people who lean left and people who lean right are perhaps equally in-
clined to listen primarily to those with whom they already agree.
Even if the Justices routinely associate with a diverse set of individuals and
groups, they cannot fully understand the impact of the issues before them without
either personal experience or exposure to the perspectives of those with personal
experience. For example, one of the stories set out in the Thornburgh NARAL
brief explained a part of the pro-choice perspective that likely would be outside
the experience of at least eight4 2 of the Thornburgh Justices:
Women are fertile from, approximately, the age of 15 to 45. Most
women will spend the majority of these 30 years trying not to get preg-
nant. But no contraceptives are one hundred percent safe and effective
and they often fail despite conscientious use:
I was a married woman using the birth control methods available at
the time; a diaphragm and a spermicide jelly. My first child was
planned and I was very happy. Slightly more than two years later I
had another planned child. Then I found myself pregnant with a
child that would be only 17 months younger than the second child.
I had used my birth control methods assiduously but to no avail. I
accepted the fact of that child and loved it. Then I got pregnant
again. This one would be only 13 months younger than the third
child. I was faced with the unpleasant fact that I could not stop the
babies from coming no matter what I did.. . . [The abortion] was a
tremendous relief and I have never regretted it. My husband then
had a vasectomy . . .. You cannot possibly know what it is like to
be the helpless pawn of nature. I am a 71 year old widow.43
40. See generally BILL BISHOP WITH ROBERT G. CUSHING, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING
OF LIKE-MINDED AMERICA IS TEARING Us APART (2008); JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND:
WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION (2012); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING
ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000).
41. Linda Greenhouse, Resetting the Post-Scalia Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/18/opinion/resetting-the-post-scalia-supreme-court.html?_r=O.
42. At the time of the Thornburgh opinion, eight of the Justices were men: Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens. See Thornburgh v. Amer-
ican College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
43. NARAL Brief, supra note 27, at 19 (citations omitted).
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When Justices understand the experience of some groups but not others, the
ideal of equal treatment before the Court may be in jeopardy. Voices briefs help
to fill the inevitable gap between a Justice's personal experience and the realities
of other lives and other perspectives.
B. Recent Examples
The stories in voices briefs come from a variety of sources, including testi-
mony before legislative or other regulatory bodies, news coverage, op-eds,
books, interviews, studies, affidavits, emails, and letters collected by organiza-
tions.4 Several examples taken from opposing briefs in Obergefell demonstrate
the strategy. The Obergefell brief filed by PFLAG45 in support of marriage equal-
ity includes eight first-person stories, each told at some length and most includ-
ing a picture.46 For example, the story of Tom and Jan Harry, parents of a lesbian
daughter, is told as a conversation, part of which is set out here:
Tom: I was born and raised in Ohio. Jan and I married in 1971 .... We
are both pastors in the United Methodist Church....
Jan: We have two children, our daughter Sonya and our son Chris....
Growing up, Sonya always dreamt of getting married and having two
kids....
Tom: Sonya came out to us an adult....
Jan: What I mainly recall about her coming out is my fear for [her]....
But ... .by 2002, she was in a committed relationship with Alison, and
they wanted to affirm their commitment in a ceremony before family
and friends. So we put up two big tents in our yard ....
[The following picture appears at this point in the brief.]
44. No court rule requires that each individual file a formal consent for a briefs inclusion of her
story. However, most of the individuals have already shared their stories in other public fora, such as in
legislative and agency processes, books, interviews with ajournalist, and court documents. Organizational
collection projects and social science studies customarily explain the purpose of the collection request. To
date, there is no indication that any private story has been shared without informal consent.
45. BriefofPFLAG, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.





Tom: Sonya and Alison are now parents of two boys, fudfilling Sonya's
childhoo d ream of being a morn, We are fortunate to live just three
blocks away from our grandchildren. Having witnessed their journey as
parents, we can say, witbout hesitation, that Sonya and Alison are con-
scientious and nurturing parents,
Jan: W r heartened to see growing acceptance of same-sex couples
in our community. But Ohio's laws still fail to recognize Sonya and Al-
isonl as a married couple . . . Not only Sonya and Alison, but our grand-
children deserve better than that. .,.. Our grandchildren deserve to know
that their famnily is worthy of the same respect as other fatmilies,.n
On the other side of the issue, the Obergefell brief filed by Same-Sx At-
tracted Men and Their Wives includes first-person stories offered to argue that
"mainwoman definitions of marriage" do not foreclose the institution of mar-
riage to gay men and lesbians,4i Portions of these stoies are interspersed
throughout the brief. For example, we meet D~anny Caldw'ell:
When Danny (7aldwelI
thing a little bit differi
with." As a young adiul
help with this, and all
reached puberty, lie realized "tha I I I
nt that I didn't think the other kid: I ad ( d al
:, Danny "started looking a lot on the Internet for
could find were thinns saying you just need to
Id. at 5~9. The use of a
in Low ond Ii'ology.
Brief of Amiei Curiae
vtanee at 7. (ThergelSit
WI. 1608211.
oeh sntrie~ h~s been a subject of dispttte cv
~patt, ('tendon Stories: Stonkv iIottertts
15 t.. & CosTovit' PsOns. 87, 1 (t5~I3t20L
SatmSex Attracted Men and Their \Vjves
~ Hodges. 135 8. (5. 2584 (2015) (Nov.
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accept ... who you are .... Deep down I knew that wasn't going to
make me happy. What I really wanted was a wife and kids ...
Danny wrote a letter to his mom, explaining his feelings. "She helped
me realize what I really did want and that I wasn't going to be happy
settling for something less. . . ." Not long after, he met his wife Erin.
Eight years, and two boys, later, Danny reflects: . . . "I can't imagine
what life would be like without Erin and without my boys. Some people
would probably say, 'You're not happy; you're just suppressing things.'
They can think what they want but ... I wouldn't want it any other
way."49
Some Justices might routinely hear the perspectives shared in one of these
briefs but not those shared in the other. If so, and if the Court is considering
issues that will deeply affect the lives of these citizens and others like them, we
would do well to assist the Court in understanding what is at stake.50
C. Kinds of Cases
To date, voices briefs have been used almost entirely in abortion rights and
marriage equality cases." These cases share two important, overlapping charac-
teristics: (1) the outcome will have a direct personal impact on the intimate lives
of those affected; and (2) the storytellers' experience is likely outside the Jus-
tices' experience. Abortion rights and marriage equality cases share the first
characteristic because they challenge a woman's control over her own body52 or
affect the deepest and most intimate of human relationships. The briefs filed in
these cases also offer perspectives far outside the personal experiences of many
judges-the perspectives of those who needed or who now regret an abortion or
those with personal experience with committed same-sex relationships.
A search of Supreme Court cases since Thornburgh has revealed only three
cases outside the abortion or marriage equality context in which voices briefs
were filed. In two of those cases, abortion and contraception nonetheless figured
49. Id. at 7, 10-11.
50. As Judge Posner has observed, "[A]ppellate lawyers would be more effective if ... [they] em-
phasized the practical stakes in the case and thus the consequences of the decision." Richard A. Posner,
The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1049, 1067 (2006).
51. See Appendix.
52. This characterization of abortion cases is described from the perspective of those seeking repro-
ductive freedom. I cannot attempt to characterize the deeper levels of the pro-life perspective. Some pro-
life advocates clearly speak from their experience of regretting their own abortions or from the experience
of having had children and now imagining aborting those children. Some may speak from their experience
of the pain of not being able to have children. These perspectives are directly related to the advocate's
own body. But some pro-life advocates without those personal experiences speak from other perspec-
tives-moral or religious beliefs or perhaps even a desire, conscious or not, to maintain power and protect
a gendered hierarchy. At least from a pro-choice perspective, all abortion motivations relate either to the
desire to protect choice over one's own body or the desire to exert control over someone else's body.
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prominently.5 3 Only one case with a voices brief was completely unrelated to
abortion or marriage equality.5 4
Voices briefs have not been filed routinely because they would have little or
nothing to offer in many cases. For instance, in Obergefell's term, the Court also
held that Medicaid providers do not have a cause of action to challenge a state's
reimbursement rates" and that a bankruptcy court's order denying confirmation
of a proposed repayment plan with leave to amend is not a final order enabling
immediate appeal.5 6 Voices briefs would serve no purpose in cases such as those.
However, while voices briefs have been used primarily in two kinds of cases,
they may soon be making appearances in others as well. For example, many
judges have little understanding of the realities of the lives of capital defendants
and convicted felons." Voices briefs also may prove useful for immigration is-
sues, police shootings, or other issues of race, class, or power disparity. It is likely
that creative advocates will continue to explore the use of nonparty stories to help
the Court understand the experience of those unlike themselves.
Since the use of voices briefs is likely to continue or even increase, we may
well wonder whether and to what degree voices briefs influence judicial out-
comes. The next section tackles that question.
53. National Federation ofIndependent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012), challenged con-
gressional power to enact provisions of the Affordable Care Act. One voices brief opposed the legislation
using pro-life stories to challenge the Act because it arguably would compel the filers to fund abortion.
Brief on Behalf of Project Liberty, in Support of the Respondents on the Individual Mandate, NFIB, 567
U.S. 519 (No. 11-398), 2012 WL 664933. On the other side, two voices briefs offered stories demonstrat-
ing the real-world consequences of inadequate health coverage prior to the act. Brief on Behalf of Asian
& Pacific Islander American Health Forum, et al., in Support of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae (Sever-
ability Issue), NFIB, 567 U.S. 519 (Nos. 11-393, 11-400), 2012 WL 549231; Brief on Behalf of National
Women's Law Center, et al., As Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner on the Minimum Coverage Provi-
sion, NFIB, 567 U.S. 519 (No. 11-398), 2012 WL 160240. The second case, brought by the Little Sisters
of the Poor Home for the Aged, challenged the Affordable Care Act's provisions ensuring coverage for
contraceptives. One voices brief offered stories about he Sisters' good work caring for the elderly, which
the Sisters might cease if they were required to facilitate contraception coverage for their employees. Brief
on Behalf of Residents and Families of Residents at Homes of the Little Sisters of the Poor in Support of
Petitioners, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S.Ct. 1557 (2016) (Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453, 14-1505, 15-35, 15-105,
15-119, 15-191), 2016 WL 183800 (2016).
54. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. raised the question whether the Alien Tort Statute allows
a domestic cause of action for violations of international law occurring outside the United States. Eleven
amicus filers offered their personal stories of Iranian violations of international law. See, e.g., Brief of
Eleven Jewish Former Residents of Iran Whose Family Members "Disappeared," As Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491), 2012
WL 2165351 (explaining that, realistically, no remedy was available to the petitioners in Iranian courts).
55. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015).
56. Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 135 S. Ct. 1686 (2015).
57. Linda H. Edwards, Advocacy as an Exercise in Virtue: Lawyering, Bad Facts, and Furman 's
High-Stakes Dilemma, 66 MERCER L. REV. 425,439-443 (2015).
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D. Assessing Influence
The influence of any form of amicus briefing is a subject of robust debate.8
Some judges and commentators have simply asserted their opinions that amicus
briefs do or do not influence courts." In another form of opinion gathering, sev-
eral studies have assessed amicus influence on the basis of interviews with
judges, lawyers, and law clerks.60 One scholar has argued that he Court's policy
of allowing nearly unlimited leave to file is itself an indication that the Court
finds amicus briefs useful.61 Another study compared "matched cases" in which
58. Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Amici Curiae Before the Supreme Court: Who Partici-
pates, When and How Much?, 52 J. POL. 782 (1990) (finding that amicus briefs influence the Court); Paul
M. Collins, Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S.
Supreme Court Litigation, 38 L. & Soc'Y REV. 807, 827 (2004) (concluding that the positive influence of
most amicus briefs is "marginal"); Kearney & Merrill, supra note 18, at 745 ("Attitudes within the legal
community about he utility and impact of amicus briefs vary widely."); Donald R. Songer & Reginald S.
Sheehan, Interest Group Success in the Courts: Amicus Participation the Supreme Court, 46 POL. RES.
Q. 339, 351 (1993) ("cast[ing] doubt on the ability of most groups to influence the outcome of specific
cases through the filing of amicus briefs"). The influence and treatment of amicus briefs has been a subject
ofjournalistic commentary. See e.g., Adam Feldman, Amicus Briefs and Oral Arguments in the Roberts
Court, EMPIRICAL SCOTUS (Mar. 7, 2016), https://empiricalscotus.com/2016/03/07/amicus-briefs-and-
oral-arguments-in-the-roberts-court/_Anthony J. Franze & R. Reeves Anderson, Commentary: The
Court's Increasing Reliance on Amicus Curiae in the Past Term, NAT'L L.J. (Aug. 24, 2011),
http://www.nationallawjoumal.com/id=1 202512150444/Commentary-The-Courts-increasing-reliance-
on-amicus-curiae-in-the-past-term?slretum=20160631160341 LAnthony J. Franze & R. Reeves Anderson,
Justices Are Paying More Attention to Amicus Briefs, NAT'L L.J. (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.nationalla-
wjournal.com/supremecourtbrief/id=120266884655 1/Justices-Are-Paying-More-Attention-to-Amicus-
Briefs; Anthony J. Franze & R. Reeves Anderson, The Supreme Court's Reliance on Amicus Curiae in
the 2011-2012 Term, NAT'L L.J. (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.nationallawjour-
nal.com/id=1202571782732/The-Supreme-Courts-reliance-on-amicus-curiae-in-the-201112-termlTony
Mauro, Bolstered by Briefs, Liberal Justices Lash Out During Contraceptive Debate, NAT'L L.J. (Mar.
23, 2016), http://www.nationallawjoumal.com/supremecourtbrief/id=1202752957056/Bolstered-by-
Briefs-Liberal-Justices-Lash-Out-During-Contraceptive-Debate; Mark Walsh, It Was Another Big Term
for Amicus Curiae Briefs at the High Court, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 1, 2013), http://www.abajoumal.com/maga-
zine/article/it-was-another-big-termfor amicus curiae briefs at thehigh-court/.
59. Neonatology Assocs., P.A. v. Commn'r, 293 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 2002) (in which then-Judge
Alito opined that "even when a party is very well represented, an amicus may provide important assistance
to the court"); see also Jonathan Alger & Marvin Krislov, You've Got To Have Friends: Lessons Learned
from the Role ofAmici in the University ofMichigan Cases, 30 J.C. & U.L. 503, 503 (2004) (pointing to
Judge Posner's view that "amicus briefs are generally repetitious" and "increase litigation costs, evade
page limitations, and promote 'interest group' politics. . . ."); Bruce J. Ennis, Effective Amicus Briefs, 33
CATH. U. L. REV. 603, 603 (1984) (quoting a practitioner asserting that "[a]micus briefs have shaped
judicial decisions in many more cases than is commonly realized"); Justice Breyer Calls for Experts To
Aid Courts in Complex Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/17/us/jus-
tice-breyer-calls-for-experts-to-aid-courts-in-complex-cases.html (quoting Justice Breyer's comment that
"[amicus] briefs play an important role in educating judges").
60. See, e.g., Victor E. Flango, Donald C. Bross & Sarah Corbally, Amicus Curiae Briefs: The
Court's Perspective, 27 JUST. SYS. J. 180 (2006) (surveying the chiefjustices and appellate court clerks
of thirty-nine state courts of last resort, most of whom found amicus briefs useful); Kelly J. Lynch, Best
Friends? Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus Curiae Briefs, 20 J.L. & POL. 33, 72 (2004)
(concluding from seventy interviews with former Supreme Court law clerks that "useful amicus briefs are
filed often enough that [filing] proves worthwhile").
61. PAUL M. COLLINS, FRIENDS OF THE SUPREME COURT: INTEREST GROUPS AND JUDICIAL
DECISION MAKING 45 (2008). Collins argues that the Court's liberal filing policy, in conjunction with its
increasing workload, "suggests that the justices genuinely believe amicus briefs can aid in their decision-
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one case included no amicus support while the other case had amicus support for
only one side.62 A study using a large database sought to compute the overall
success rates of amicus filers.63 Other studies have counted and analyzed cases
in which the Court has cited to amicus briefs' or counted the number of amicus
briefs filed for each side (and by whom) and compared outcomes.65 A recent
study used plagiarism detection software to identify cases in which the Court
used language likely taken from an amicus brief.66
These comments and studies are valuable, providing important information
about today's amicus practice, but all of them are subject to one or more meth-
odological limitations. An unsupported opinion, even that of a well-known
judge, is, in the final analysis, one person's view. Compiling interview responses
from judges, lawyers, and clerks uses a larger sample size but still suffers from
the subjectivity of opinion-gathering. The Court's liberal filing policy was more
likely adopted because of the Court's workload rather than in spite of it, for it
would take far longer to go through a serious process of pre-filing assessment
than it currently takes a law clerk to sort through a stack of filed amicus briefs to
making process. If they did not view amicus briefs as useful tools . . . the Court would likely deny per-
mission to file . . . ." Id.
62. Songer & Sheehan, supra note 58. Songer and Sheehan paired cases that (I) were decided in the
same term; (2) involved parties of the same status; and (3) involved the same subject matter categories.
They found no evidence of amicus influence. Id. at 341-45.
63. Kearney and Merrill compared outcomes with disparities in amicus support. Their study, by far
the largest to date, analyzed a database of 6,141 cases spanning nearly fifty years, categorized them by
whether the decision below was set aside, and compared those results to the number of amicus briefs filed
in support of each party. The study also tracked amicus filings by the Solicitor General, the American
Civil Liberties Union, The AFL-CIO, and the States. The study concluded, in part, that amicus briefs
overall do appear to affect Supreme Court success rates. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 18, at 750,
787-801.
64. See e.g., Sarah F. Corbally, Donald C. Bross & Victor E. Flango, Filing ofAmicus Curiae Briefs
in State Courts of Last Resort: 1960-2000, 25 JUST. SYs. J. 39, 53 (2004) (counting citations by state
courts of last resort o amicus briefs as an "indirect indicator of the influence of amicus briefs" and finding
that amicus briefs were cited in about a third of the relevant state court cases); Larsen, supra note 18, at
1777-79 (finding 606 citations to amicus briefs from 2008 to 2013, 124 of which were cited for assertions
of legislative fact, and concluding that "Justices treat amici as experts, not as a research tool"). Some
scholars have analyzed the Court's opinions in specific cases or a specific line of cases. See e.g., Matthew
L.M. Fletcher, The Utility of Amicus Briefs in the Supreme Court's Indian Cases, 2 AM. INDIAN L.J. 38
(2013); Dan Schweitzer, Fundamentals of Preparing a United States Supreme Court Amicus Brief, 5 J.
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 523 (2003) (pointing to the oral argument in Grutter v. Bollinger, in which ques-
tioning expressly referred to the amicus brief filed by Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr., et al., which later
became known as the "military brief'); Sylvia H. Walbolt & Joseph H. Lang, Jr., Amicus Briefs Revisited,
33 STETSON L. REV. 171 (2003) (analyzing the Grutter military amicus brief).
65. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 58 (comparing the number of amicus briefs with results in the
cases); Kearney & Merrill, supra note 18, at 769-71 (citing Steven Puro, The Role of Amicus Curiae in
the United States Supreme Court: 1920-1966, (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New
York at Buffalo) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review)); id. at 788.
66. Paul M. Collins, Jr., Pamela C. Corley, & Jesse Hamner, The Influence ofAmicus Curiae Briefs
on U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Content, 49 L. & SOC'Y REV. 917 (2015).
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decide which warrant further attention. Matching cases based simply on proce-
dural and subject matter similarities is surely a dicey undertaking,67 and compar-
ing outcomes to amicus filings fails to account for the content of opinions68 and
may reflect the respective strength on the merits rather than the influence of the
amicus briefs.
Conclusions drawn from analyzing Supreme Court opinions are also inher-
ently limited. A judge does not write an opinion to tell us how he or she became
persuaded of the opinion's outcome. The influences that account for that decision
happened before the opinion was written and largely in private. The purpose of
the opinion, rather, is tojustify the decision in a public document. Thus, the opin-
ion will cite to sources the judge believes will be most persuasive to the opinion's
readers.69 The number of citations to amicus briefs likely tells us less about the
briefs' influence than about the opinion-writer's strategic persuasive choices.70
Finally, "influence" is a much larger and more multifaceted concept than
studies have yet captured. A brief might influence whether a party wins or loses
or the scope of the decision rendered in the case. It might influence the legal path
the Court selects to justify that outcome, such as the selection of a particular
standard of review. Or it might influence a key policy argument on which the
Court relies or a particular assessment of the facts. It might even influence the
tone of respect or disrespect with which the opinion is written. 7  All of these
kinds of influences are both likely and important, but none is especially suscep-
tible to qualitative or quantitative analysis.
Comprehensively assessing amicus influence, then, is probably impossible,
and that is especially true for amicus voices briefs. It is possible only to speculate
by reading the tea leaves after an oral argument or reading between the lines in
an occasional opinion.
67. Kearney and Merrill observed that the Songer-Sheehan study "has potentially serious limita-
tions," in part because the study's matching methodology was "very crude;" for example, "all cases in-
volving 'labor management disputes' were regarded as presenting the 'same issue,' as were all cases in-
volving 'judicial power."' Kearney & Merrill, supra note 18, at 771 n.95.
68. Collins, Corley & Hamner, supra note 66, at 918 (noting that most studies "do not address the
content of the Court's opinions, which is the most significant means by which the Court contributes to
legal and social policy").
69. Left for another day is the question of whether and to what degree the Justices understand their
own analytical processes and the unconscious frames that influence their own decision making.
70. One study ventures beyond analysis of amicus influence to draw conclusions about models of
Supreme Court judging. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 18. The article identifies three possible models:
(1) the traditional legal model, which attributes a Justice's decisions to his or her views of the authoritative
sources of law, such as governing text, precedent, and policy arguments; (2) the attitudinal model, which
would attribute a Justice's decisions to his or her preexisting political beliefs; and (3) the interest group
model, which would attribute a Justice's decisions to his or her desire to satisfy particular organized
groups. Id. at 774-87. The study concludes "cautiously" that its results "provid[ed] more support for the
legal model than for either the attitudinal or interest group models." Id. at 750. Interestingly, the interest
group model is strikingly similar to the concept of"response involvement" identified by Elaboration Like-
lihood Model (ELM) theorists in which a decision maker is influenced by what others may think of the
decision. See infra note 183.
71. See infra notes 220-223 and accompanying text.
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For example, we can infer possible influence of voices briefs in the abortion
context.7 2 The first two voices briefs were filed in 1985 (on the pro-choice side
in Thornburgh) and 1989 (on the pro-choice side in Webster). These voices briefs
shared grim stories from hundreds of women who had sought illegal abortions
out of desperation, or whose abortion had allowed them to escape appalling cir-
cumstances or enabled them to fulfill existing responsibilities to dependent fam-
ily members. Then, in 1992, the Court took up Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.7 3 One scholar has identified a key portion of
Justice Kennedy's Casey opinion, where we find echoes of the pro-choice voices
briefs.7 4 Justice Kennedy75 wrote:
Her suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without
more, upon its own vision of the woman's role, however dominant that
vision has been in the course of our history and our culture. The destiny
of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception
of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society.76
Justice Kennedy's understanding of women's "intimate and personal suffering"
may have come in part from the stories women had shared with the Court.
Then, following the filing of a pro-life voices brief with affidavits from
women who later regretted their abortions, Justice Kennedy famously wrote in
the 2007 Carhart opinion: "While we find no reliable data to measure the phe-
nomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret
their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained."77 Again, we
must wonder whether these comments were influenced by the voices briefs filed
in Thornburgh, Webster, and Carhart.7
8
At least one other Justice may have been influenced as well.79 Justice Gins-
burg described the abortion issue as a matter of full citizenship, just as the Thorn-
burgh NARAL brief had framed the issue:80
72. Edwards, supra note 10, at 1344-45.
73. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
74. Reva B. Siegel, Abortion and the "Woman Question": Forty Years ofDebate, 89 IND. L.J. 1365,
1377-78 (2014).
75. Voices briefs undoubtedly are intended primarily for Justices like Justice Kennedy-those per-
ceived to be swing voters on the issue. Confirmed pro-life or pro-choice Justices are unlikely to re-think
their votes after reading nonparty stories. They might, however, moderate the tone they adopt in writing
either the opinion of the Court or their own concurring or dissenting opinions. See infra notes 220-223
and accompanying text.
76. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
77. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007).
78. But see Ruben J. Garcia, A Democratic Theory ofAmicus Advocacy, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 315,
352-53 (2008) (asserting that the Carhart voices brief "likely did not play a dispositive role in the out-
come").
79. Given Justice Ginsburg' well-known commitment to reproductive rights, it is unlikely that the
voices brief influenced her to change her opinion. Rather, we are here speaking of the kind of influence
that affects the writing of the opinion. See supra text accompanying note 71.
80. See supra note 27 and accompanying text; infra notes 101, 227-235 and accompanying text.
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As Casey comprehended, at stake in cases challenging abortion re-
strictions is a woman's "control over her [own] destiny.". . . Women, it
is now acknowledged, have the talent, capacity, and right "to participate
equally in the economic and social life of the Nation." Their ability to
realize their full potential, the Court recognized, is intimately connected
to "their ability to control their reproductive lives." Thus, legal chal-
lenges to undue restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek to vin-
dicate some generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on a
woman's autonomy to determine her life's course, and thus to enjoy
equal citizenship stature.8 1
As recently as Obergefell, we may have seen signs of influence. In Oberge-
fell, nine voices briefs were filed in support of marriage equality. The briefs viv-
idly recounted stories of the love, struggle, and suffering of committed same-sex
couples and their children. As they told their stories, the couples explained why
marriage is important to them, what it brings or would bring to their lives, to their
relationships, and to their families. They wanted to marry for all the reasons that
prompt any couple to want to marry. Those themes were eloquently reflected in
the final paragraph of Justice Kennedy's opinion:
No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest
ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family. In forming a mar-
ital union, two people become something greater than once they were.
As some of the petitioners in these cases demonstrate, marriage embod-
ies a love that may endure ven past death. It would misunderstand these
men and women to say they disrespect the idea of marriage. Their plea
is that they do respect it, respect it so deeply that they seek to find its
fulfillment for themselves. Their hope is not to be condemned to live in
loneliness, excluded from one of civilization's oldest institutions. They
ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them
that right.82
The paragraph's text mentions only "the petitioners," but it may not be too much
of a reach to think that Justice Kennedy had others in mind as well.
Even Justice Scalia seemed to credit some of the Obergefell voices briefs, at
least the seven filed in opposition to marriage equality. Those briefs had told
stories in which same-sex relationships were said to have caused harm to chil-
dren. In oral argument, when Solicitor General Verrilli was rebutting the States'
concern about the welfare of children, the following exchange occurred:
81. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 171-72 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
82. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015). Justice Kennedy also noted that marriage
"safeguards children and families," echoing the stories of amicus filers. Id. at 2600.
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General Verrilli: All of the evidence so far shows you that there isn't a
problem, and ... the States' argument really is quite ironic in this re-
spect that it's going to deny marriage, the State - -
Justice Scalia: That - - that's quite a statement. All of the evidence shows
there is no problem....
General Verrilli: I - - I think all of the leading organizations that have
filed briefs have said to you that there is a consensus in that, and -
Justice Scalia: Well, I think some of the - - some of the briefs contra-
dicted that.83
Of course, all this speculation is merely that-speculation. But such infer-
ences may be the best we can do to assess influence. And even if we cannot
evaluate their direct influence on any particular Justice, it is nonetheless im-
portant to preserve a place for voices briefs. As Part IV will explain, cognitive
theory shows that stories may be the only way to counter the effects of uncon-
scious preexisting schemas that inevitably influence human decision making.
And as Part V will remind us, the ability to be heard is fundamental to effective
government, especially when the affected citizen does not prevail.
E. Voices Briefs and Traditional Amicus Roles
Over the years, Supreme Court amicus filers have served multiple important
roles, including these:
* Adding legal sources or traditional legal arguments not made
by the parties;
* Supplementing the record with policy facts such as economic
and social science studies;
* Raising policy matters and other possible implications of the
Court's decision;
* Providing the benefit of special expertise;
* Underscoring by their very participation the importance of the
issues to be decided;
* Demonstrating the scope and variety of affected persons or en-
tities;
83. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556,
14-562, 14-571, 14-574), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/14-
556ql_7148.pdf.
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* Representing marginalized groups that might not otherwise be
heard;
* Taking a position on behalf of the public interest;
* Advocating on behalf of litigants in related cases; and
* Offering input from affected industries or enterprises.84
Voices briefs fulfill many of these traditional amicus roles. The Obergefell
voices briefs listed in the Appendix provide examples. Some take positions on
behalf of the nation's common interest. For example, one set of stories argued
for "a country where all gay men and lesbians are constitutionally guaranteed the
right to marry and are able to access the same dignity, status, and responsibility"
as other married couples.85 Another set used their stories to argue that constitu-
tional protection for same-sex marriage would "inexorably result in additional
violations of free speech rights," and that the court should "reaffirm the im-
portance of free debate and free inquiry in this democratic Republic."86
The briefs added sources and arguments not made by the parties. For exam-
ple, the brief on behalf of Same-Sex Attracted Men and Their Wives added the
arguments that "man-woman marriage laws do not ... exclude same-sex at-
tracted men and women from the institution of man-woman marriage."8 7 A brief
in support of marriage equality added the long history of "a culture and language
of animus against LGBT Americans."8
The briefs raised policy arguments and possible implications of the Court's
decision. For example, one brief argued for the importance of biological parent-
ing.89 Several briefs offered stories to show that children benefit from marriage
equality and are harmed by its denial.90 Other voices briefs offered stories to
84. See generally REAGAN W. SIMPSON & MARY R. VASALY, THE AMICuS BRIEF: ANSWERING THE
TEN MOST IMPORTANT QUESTIONS ABOUT AMICUS PRACTICE 24-31 (4th ed. 2015); Flango, Bross &
Corbally, supra note 60; see also Anderson, supra note 18, at 367-369; Larsen, supra note 18, at 1757-
61; Allison Lucas, Friends of the Court? The Ethics ofAmicus Brief Writing in First Amendment Litiga-
tion, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1605, 1610-11 (1999).
85. Brief for Kristin M. Perry et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 26, Obergefell, 135
S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), 2015 WL 1048444.
86. BriefofAmici Curiae Religious Organizations, Public Speakers, and Scholars Concerned About
Free Speech in Support of Respondents at 10, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571,
14-574), 2015 WL 1534343.
87. Brief of Amici Curiae Same-Sex Attracted Men and Their Wives in Support of Respondents &
Affirmance, supra note 48, at 7.
88. Brief of Mattachine Society of Washington, D.C. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at
5, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), 2015 WL 1048438.
89. Brief of Amici Curiae Organizations that Promote Biological Parenting in Support of Respond-
ents, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), 2015 WL 1569761.
90. Brief of Amicus Curiae Marriage Equality USA in Support of Petitioners, Obergefell, 135 S.
Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), 2015 WL 1022683; Brief of Amici Curiae Family Equal-
ity Council, Colage, and Kinsey Morrison in Support of Petitioners, Addressing the Merits and Supporting
Reversal, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), 2015 WL 1022686; Brief
of PFLAG, supra note 45; Brief of The County of Cuyahoga, Ohio as Amicus Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioners, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14-556), 2015 WL 981535.
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show the opposite.91 They also demonstrated the scope and variety of affected
persons or entities, including litigants in related cases. 92 Others shared the stories
of marginalized groups that might not otherwise be heard. For example, one brief
offered the stories of individuals who had been subjected to sexual-orientation
change therapies.93
Finally, voices briefs can supplement the record with what are essentially
social and policy facts. The stories play a role much like that played by the social
science information in the historic "Brandeis Brief' 94 or the Appellants' brief in
Brown v. Board of Education.9' The policy role is the primary role of voices
briefs, but the current role of social science information in the appellate process
is both complex and controversial. Social science has played a recognized appel-
late role for over a century, but, even aside from possible jurisprudential objec-
tions,96 common beliefs about social science's judicial role may be naive. They
may be based, in part, on inaccurate assumptions about the nature of the infor-
mation offered in today's briefs and relied upon by today's Court. As Parts II and
III will show, a closer look at current practice leads to the perhaps surprising
conclusion that individual narratives may be more similar to today's social sci-
ence information than it would appear.
II. POLICY FACTS IN THE FORM OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
The use of social science information on appeal rests, in part, on the some-
times misunderstood distinction between adjudicative (evidentiary) facts and
legislative (policy) facts. Adjudicative facts are the case-specific facts about the
events and the named parties. Adjudicative facts are determined at the trial court
91. Brief of Amici Curiae Organizations that Promote Biological Parenting, supra note 89; Brief of
Amici Curiae Robert Oscar Lopez and B. N. Klein in Support of Respondents, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), 2015 WL 1519053 (arguing that children of same-sex couples are
harmed); Brief of Amicae Curiae Heather Barwick and Katy Faust in Support of Respondents, Obergefell,
135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), 2015 WL 1534345; BriefofAmicae Curiae Dawn
Stefanowicz and Denise Shick in Support of Respondents, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-
562, 14-571, 14-574), 2015 WL 1519047.
92. Brief of Ninety-Two Plaintiffs in Marriage Cases in Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Indiana, Kan-
sas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina,
South Dakota and Texas as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-
556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), 2015 WL1022702; Brief for Kristin M. Perry et al., supra note 85.
93. Brief of Amici Curiae Survivors of Sexual Orientation Change Therapies in Support of Peti-
tioners, Urging Reversal, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), 2015 WL
1021452.
94. See infra notes 104-110 and accompanying text.
95. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
96. For instance, the "balls and strikes" view of the judicial role at least purports to reject social and
policy considerations of what the law should be rather than what it is. As Chief Justice Roberts famously
declared, "[it's my job to call balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat." John Roberts, My Job Is To Call
Balls and Strikes and Not To Pitch or Bat, CNN, (Sept. 12, 2005),
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/12/roberts.statement/.
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level, using the rules of evidence. Legislative facts, however, are facts that pro-
vide context for understanding the interpretive issues raised by the case.97 Leg-
islative facts can and often are raised for the first time on appeal and are not
subject to evidentiary rules. The distinction between legislative facts and adjudi-
cative facts has long been accepted as part of traditional legal method.98 Legisla-
tive facts are used to establish social context, such as the harmful effects of racial
segregation on educational achievement.99 Social science information is one of
the most common sources for legislative (policy) facts, and the Court has often
relied on social science to support its decisions.'00
Voices briefs offer non-party stories as legislative facts, not as adjudicative
facts. The original voices brief filed in Thornburgh explained how the stories
related to record evidence:
While these letters do not constitute swom testimony or record evidence,
they do provide an invaluable source of information about the lives of
women who choose to have an abortion. When abortion is examined in
the context of women's lives, the constitutional foundations for a
woman's right to decide "whether or not to terminate her pregnancy"
become obvious. What also becomes clear is that this Court's decision
in Roe v. Wade is firmly rooted in our nation's most fundamental tradi-
tions of personal integrity and human dignity.'
The stories shared in a voices brief are not social science, of course. At its
best, social science presents empirically verified information compiled and ana-
lyzed by a researcher who is as close to neutral as possible. The best studies use
double-blind processes and well-crafted instruments. They compile information
from large data sets. They account for outliers and otherwise unreliable re-
97. See generally Paul J. Kiernan, Better Living Through Judicial Notice, 36 LITIGATION 43 (2009).
Judge Posner has identified a number of factual categories:
[Oiften what is left out ofa briefis background material ... that would ... reassure us that we
understood the real-world setting of the case. Those are not "adjudicative facts," which if con-
tested can reliably be established (it is believed) only by the adversary process of a trial ....
Besides adjudicative facts, . . . there are . . . also "legislative facts," which are facts that bear
on the design or interpretation of legal doctrines.
Richard A. Posner, Judicial Opinions and Appellate Advocacy in Federal Courts-One Judge's Views, 51
DUQUESNE L. REV. 3,11 (2013).
98. See Richard Cappalli, The Disappearance ofLegal Method, 70 TEMPLE L. REV. 393, 400, 405
(1997). The distinction between adjudicative facts and legislative facts is not always clear, however. See
Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems ofEvidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L.
REV. 364, 402 (1942).
99. John Monahan, Laurens Walker & Gregory Mitchell, Contextual Evidence ofGender Discrim-
ination: The Ascendance of "Social Frameworks," 94 VA. L. REV. 1715, 1716 (2008).
100. See e.g., Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1993 (2014); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-
70 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002).
101. NARAL Brief, supra note 27, at 5 (internal citations omitted).
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sponses. They minimize inherent subjectivity. They use techniques such as mul-
tiple regression analyses to exclude other potentially causal relationships.102
Non-party stories offered in voices briefs do not use these methods.
But neither do many of the social science studies offered in Supreme Court
briefs.03 The first social science brief was the celebrated "Brandeis Brief"0
filed in Muller v. Oregon.os The issue in Muller was whether Oregon could con-
stitutionally restrict working hours for women based on a state interest in pro-
tecting women's health.106 The Brandeis Brief's 101 pages consisted almost en-
tirely of non-legal information, such as statements by doctors, academics,
anonymous government employees, and co-workers relating observations of and
opinions about the lives of women workers. Virtually all of the named sources
were men telling stories about women they had known. The brief includes page
after page of entries such as these:
Mr. B-, a foreman of a printing establishment:
"Girls must sit at the 'case.' I never knew but one woman, and she a
strong, vigorous Irishwoman, of unusual height, who could stand at the
case like a man. Female compositors, as a rule, are sickly, suffering
much from backache, headache, weak limbs, and general 'female weak-
ness. "'107
A male mule-spinner (a man who operated a spinning machine in a cot-
ton mill), describing the women he worked beside:
"I have noticed that the hard, slavish overwork is driving those girls into
the saloons, after they leave the mills evenings . . . good, respectable
girls, but they come out so tired and so thirsty and so exhausted ....
Wherever you go ... near the abodes of [overworked employees], you
will always find the sign of the rum-shop."'0 8
102. Social scientists disagree about the degree to which social science should aspire only to the
methods used by the physical and natural sciences rather than embracing the more interpretive methods
of some researchers. Robert P. Bums, Social Science and the Ways of the Trial Court: Possibilities of
Translation, in ELIZABETH MERTZ, WILLIAM K. FORD & GREGORY MATOESIAN, TRANSLATING THE
SOCIAL WORLD FOR LAW: LINGUISTIC TOOLS FORA NEW LEGAL REALISM 212 (2016). This Article does not
take a position on those questions. Rather, the point is to show that these more interpretive methods have
long and often been presented to the Court as part of constitutional argument.
103. See generally Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science:
Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REv. 91 (1993); Larsen, supra note 18.
104. Brief for Defendant in Error, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (No. 107), https://louis-
ville.edullaw/library/special-collections/the-louis-d.-brandeis-collection/the-brandeis-brief-in-its-en-
tirety.
105. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
106. Id. at 417.
107. Brief for Defendant in Error, supra note 104, at 38.
108. Id. at 45.
[Vol. 29:2950
Telling Stories in the Supreme Court
An anonymous ource quoted in a report from the Maine Bureau ofIn-
dustrial and Labor Statistics:
"Many saleswomen are so worn out, when their week's work is ended,
that a good part of their Sundays is spent in bed, recuperating for the
next week's demands. And one by one girls drop out and die, often from
sheer overwork. This I know from observation and personal acquaint-
ance." 09
Another anonymous peaker at a legislative session:
"The woman wage-earner, gentlemen, does not always live at the mill-
gates; she is therefore obliged to make a half or three-quarters' hour
journey before she arrives; consequently she will leave home at half-
past five in the morning, only to return at half-past eight or nine o'clock
in the evening. Is that living? Under such circumstances can a woman
truly care for her children and her home?""i0
Only two paragraphs quote a woman describing her own experience, her
own health, her own family, or her own economic situation. The other 101 pages
consist of quotations from anonymous speakers or from speakers whose xper-
tise is absent or impossible to discern and whose reliability and neutrality are
unknown. Nearly all the quoted sources are speaking entirely out of their own
subjectivity. On the question of reliability, the "social science" information in
the iconic Brandeis Brief cannot be considered more reliable than the non-party
stories of today's voices briefs.
While social science research as improved since 1908, the social science
information in modem Supreme Court briefing does not hold itself to those im-
proved standards."' In fact, it often differs little from stories presented in voices
briefs. The two social science amicus briefs filed in Citizens United are instruc-
tive. The first of two briefs for the Institute for Justice presented "empirical in-
formation" purporting to show that disclosure requirements chill political
109. Id. at 30.
110. Id.at51.
111. An exception is the Obergefell brief filed on behalf of the American Sociological Association
(ASA), a professional organization of sociologists. The ASA publishes nine peer-reviewed journals and
is bound by state-of-the-art standards of research methodology and objectivity. See Brief of Amicus Curiae
American Sociological Association in Support of Petitioners at 1, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), 2015 WL 1048442. The ASA's brief presents social sci-
ence research that meets those standards and critiques the social science arguments made by other filers.
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speech.1 12 The brief relied on a 2007 study by Dr. Dick Carpenter, 113 who hap-
pens to serve as the amicus-filer's very own "Director of Strategic Research."ll4
Dr. Carpenter gathered individuals (we have no idea how) and questioned them
about whether they feared reprisal for their political speech. We do not know
how the questioning was conducted or what instrument, if any, was used. Dr.
Carpenter described the interviewees' statements to show that they did indeed
fear reprisal. The results he reported from these interviews congenially supported
his organization's legal arguments. As part of its social science presentation, the
brief also provided what it called "anecdotal evidence" taken largely from news-
paper articles relating the stories of third parties."' These newspaper reports
were offered to show that the fear of reprisal is "real and reasonable."11 6
The first of two briefs filed by the Center for Competitive Politics provides
another example of a brief that relies on newspaper stories as part of its social
science analysis."' The brief relates media coverage of stories of alleged retri-
bution for political donations, presenting this media coverage as objective fact,
not subjective narrative. Yet these stories differ little from stories told in voices
briefs.
These examples raise the question of just how different voices briefs are
from today's social science briefs. Newspaper articles, op-eds, and statements
made in focus groups are no more reliable when presented as social science than
when presented as stories. Nor is it more reliable to hear someone's story through
the voice and perspective of a third party rather than directly from the person
who lived that experience herself."8
Further, for voices briefs offered to provide social context, reliability in the
classic evidentiary sense may not be the most important question. The point of
the stories in a voices brief is not to establish evidentiary facts but rather to share
the experience and human perspective of the speaker."9 As one scholar has ob-
112. Brief of the Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant, Citizens United at
6-7, Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 147860.
113. Dick M. Carpenter II, Disclosure Costs: Unintended Consequences of Campaign Finance Re-
form, INST. FOR JUST. 5-6 (Mar. 2007), http://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/DisclosureCosts.pdf
114. Id. at 8. See also Dick M. Carpenter Biography, INST. FOR JUST., http://ij.org/staff/dick-m-
carpenter-ii-ph-d/.
115. Brief of the Institute for Justice, supra note 112, at 14.
116. Id.atl3.
117. Brief of Amicus Curiae Center for Competitive Politics in Support of Appellant, Citizens
United, 558 U.S. 310 (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 132719.
118. In fact, in at least some legal settings, third-party reporters are excluded in favor of the speaker
herself. The evidentiary rule of hearsay is based on the belief that, generally, first-person statements are
more reliable than third-party descriptions of those statements. FED. R. EvID. 801.
119. This role is to be distinguished from the reporting of false or unsupported social science or
evidentiary facts ("fake news"), such as President Trump's original claim that he won the popular vote by
a landslide, see Glenn Kessler, Trump's Repeated Claim That He Won a 'Landslide' Victory, WASH. POST
(Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/11/30/trumps-repeated-
claim-that-he-won-a-landslide-victory/?utmterm=.7b9d0772017c, or that he would have won the popu-
lar vote had not millions of unauthorized immigrants voted illegally, see Michael D. Shear & Emmarie
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served in another context: "Helpfulness cannot be reduced to 'reliability' under-
stood in the ways in which Daubert at least seemed to imply... . There is no
categorical reason why social scientific perspectives cannot contribute to the in-
terpretive enterprise and the evaluative enterprise as well."1 20 The same may be
said of the personal stories related in a voices brief.
Voices briefs, then, may not be functionally different from commonly ac-
cepted social science briefs that rely on stories from focus groups, newspaper
articles, legislative testimony, and third-party reports describing someone else's
experience. The point here is not to argue that the flaws in social science briefs
render them unhelpful. It is instead to point out that voices briefs should be com-
pared to an accurate understanding of modem amicus briefing, not a fantasy of
social science briefing in a utopian world.
III. OTHER FORMS OF POLICY FACTS
New law students may imagine a pristine form of appellate deliberation in
which judges rely solely on constitutional and statutory text, judicial precedent,
and policy arguments in the form of reliable social science. But legal realists
know that judges also rely on a limitless batch of other information, some pre-
sented in the briefs and some completely absent from the litigants' arguments. A
survey of judicial opinions shows the variety of such facts and their sources,121
many of which were not included in the litigants' briefs but rather were the prod-
uct of independent factual research by the Court.122 One scholar has noted, over
a span of 15 years, more than 100 Supreme Court opinions that cite to one or
multiple factual sources not found in the record or the briefs.123 Examples in-
clude:
* Google, Wikipedia, and other websites;124
Huetteman, Trump Repeats Lie About Popular Vote in Meeting With Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/us/politics/donald-trump-congress-democrats.html.
120. Bums, supra note 102, at 212 (referring to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S.
579 (1993), which decided the standard for admitting expert testimony at trial).
121. This quest for facts may not be surprising, given the reality that the Court's work is set in a
relatively low-information environment. See Ryan Salzman, Christopher J. Williams & Bryan T. Calvin,
The Determinants of the Number ofAmicus Briefs Filed Before the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-2001, 32
JUST. SYs. J. 293, 296, 298 (2011).
122. "It is a matter of common knowledge that courts occasionally consult sources not in evidence,
ranging anywhere from dictionaries to medical treatises." Johnson v. United States, 780 F.2d. 902, 910
(11th Cir. 1986).
123. Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255, 1262 &
n.37, 1272-77 (2012) (appendix on file with the Virginia Law Review).
124. See, e.g., Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754, 757 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing a Wikipedia
article about YouTube); United States v. Ford, 683 F.3d 761, 768 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing a Wikipedia
article about DNA profiling); Prude v. Clarke, 675 F.3d 732, 734 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing a Wikipedia
article about anal fissures). Citation to Google searches and Wikipedia has prompted considerable com-
mentary. See, e.g., Daniel J. Baker, A Jester's Promenade: Citations to Wikipedia in Law Reviews, 2002-
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* books, magazines, and pamphlets;125
* articles in academic journals;126
* medical treatises;127
* a personal survey of violent video games;128
* Gallup Poll results (not cited in the resulting opinion);129
* historical sources;30
* updating an incomplete study by letters from the Court to state
officials in three states;'31
* newspapers;132 and
* photographs from the web.'33
2008, 7 J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. Soc'y 361 (2012); Coleen Barger, Challenging Judicial Notice ofFacts
on the Internet Under Federal Rule ofEvidence 201, 48 U.S.F. L. REV. 43, 70 (2013) ("[E]ven Wikipedia
is coming to be seen as an acceptable source for certain kinds of data."); Joseph L. Gerken, How Courts
Use Wikipedia, 11 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 191 (2010); Jason C. Miller & Hannah B. Murray, Wikipedia
in Court: When and How Citing Wikipedia and Other Consensus Websites Is Appropriate, 84 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 633 (2010); Diane Murley, In Defense of Wikipedia, 100 L. LIBR. J. 593 (2008); Lee F. Peoples,
The Citation of Wikipedia in Judicial Opinions, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1 (2009); R. Jason Richards, Court-
ing Wikipedia, 44 TRIAL 62 (2008).
125. See infra notes 147-155 and accompanying text.
126. Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 858 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (gathering
in two appendices academic articles on the psychological harm of playing violent video games).
127. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129-62 (1973); see also supra note 159-160 and accom-
panying text.
128. Brown, 564 U.S. at 816-21 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito wrote:
These games feature visual imagery and sounds that are strikingly realistic . . . . In some of
these games, the violence is astounding.... The objective of one game is to rape a mother and
her daughters; in another, the goal is to rape Native American women. There is a game in
which players engage in "ethnic cleansing" and can choose to gun down African-Americans,
Latinos, or Jews.
Id. at 816-819. Justice Alito's opinion was peppered with citations to websites like slashgear.com and
popularmechanics.com.
129. Prior to writing the Court's opinion in Roe v. Wade, Justice Blackmun collected Gallup Poll
results showing that a majority of Americans favored abortion rights. Ken I. Kersch, Becoming Justice
Blackmun: Harry Blackmun's Supreme Court Journey by Linda Greenhouse, COMMENTARY (July 1,
2005), http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/becoming-justice-blackmun-by-linda-greenhouse/.
130. For example, Justice Thomas cited to fifty-seven extra-record sources to show that the Found-
ers believed that parents had complete authority over their children's development. Brown, 564 U.S. at
822-35 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see Larsen, supra note 123, at 1261-62.
131. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 63-64 (2010) (updating an incomplete study).
132. Id.; Larsen, supra note 123, at 1271 (noting the Court's citation to newspaper articles from
local counties reporting sentences ofjuvenile offenders).
133. See e.g., Alison Frankel, Can Federal Judges Base Rulings on Their Own Investigations?,
REUTERS (Mar. 21, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2014/03/21/can-federal-judges-base-
rulings-on-their-own-investigations/; infra text accompanying note 139. For commentary and analysis of
nontraditional sources, see generally Adam Aft, Tom Cummins & Joshua Cumby, Web 2.0 Citations in
the Federal Courts, 3 J.L. (2 J. LEGAL METRICS) 31 (2013) (analyzing citation of user-generated content);
Coleen M. Barger, Accessing the Law: On the Internet, Nobody Knows You're aJudge: Appellate Courts'
Use of Internet Materials, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 417 (2002); Robert C. Berring, Legal Information
and the Search for Cognitive Authority, 88 CALIF. L. REv. 1673, 1689-91 (2000) (finding United States
Supreme Court citation to "authorities from all comers of the information galaxy"); John J. Hasko, Per-
suasion in the Court: Nonlegal Materials in U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, 94 L. LIBR. J. 427 (2002)
(finding a pattern of use of nonlegal materials); Larsen, supra note 123; Ellie Margolis, Authority Without
Borders: The World Wide Web and the Delegalization of Law, 41 SETON HALL L. REv. 909, 920 (2011)
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Judge Richard Posner has become the poster-child for extra-record research.
In Rowe v, Gibson, for example, an inmate argued that prison officials were de-
liberately indifferent to his medical condition.4 T lo analyze Rowe's medical ar-
guments, Judge Posner cited to internet sources uch as the National Institutes of
Hlealth, the Mayo Clinic, WebMD, and Wiktpedia" The opinion prompted a
kerfuffle among the panel itself"~ and in public conmmentary." In Grayson v.
Schuler,1  a case arguing for a prisoner's right to wear his hair in dreadlocks,
Judge Posner included a web photograph along with the comment, "Dreadlocks
can attain a formidable length and density, as shown in this photograph of the
late Jamaican musician Bob Marley (a Rastafarian):"'
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Judge Posner has even argued for a variety of appellate fact investigation.140
For instance, he recently used his staff to perform in-chambers experiments.
Mitchell v. JCG Industries, Inc. raised the question of whether time spent "don-
ning and doffing" safety equipment entitled employees to overtime pay.' 41 Ap-
parently unsatisfied with the trial court record on how much time was at issue,
Judge Posner purchased the safety equipment and videotaped his office staff as
they proceeded to "don" and "doff." 42 Based in significant part on his own in-
chambers experiment, Judge Posner concluded that employers need not pay for
time spent donning and doffing work-required clothing.143
If appellate courts can perform private in-chambers experiments directly per-
taining to the evidentiary facts at issue-experiments unknown to the parties and
therefore not subject to refutation or response-surely policy facts offered in
publicly available briefs, which are subject to rebuttal by any party or other ami-
cus filer, should constitute acceptable argument.'"
Though some of Judge Posner's independent factual research is, perhaps in-
tentionally, more striking, such extra-record explorations are not new and are not
limited to circuit courts.145 Supreme Court Justices have long relied on extra-
record factual research.146 Here are just a few unremarkable examples:
* In Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, Justice Breyer de-
scribed steel-belted radial tires at some length, even including
a drawing of tire construction.147 He relied on this 1998 soft-
back book still easily available for a popular market from Am-
azon Books:148
140. Judge Posner has criticized a norm against judicial research into the facts. RICHARD A.
POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 136-143 (2013).
141. 745 F.3d 837, 842 (7th Cir. 2014).
142. Id. at 842.
143. Id. at 845-46.
144. For example, Fed. R. Evid. 201(e), the related rule on judicial notice, requires that parties be
permitted the opportunity to be heard when the court is inclined to take judicial notice of a fact. Professor
Barger has observed that taking judicial notice "without observing the niceties of due process [giving the
other party notice and an opportunity to be heard] may constitute an abuse of discretion." Barger, supra
note 124, at 68. See also Garcia, supra note 78, at 347 (arguing that information provided in amicus briefs
is preferable because it is visible).
145. See, e.g., United States v. Bari, 599 F.3d 176, 180 (2d Cir. 2010):
Twenty years ago, to confirm an intuition about the variety of rain hats, a trial judge may have
needed to travel to a local department store to survey the rain hats on offer. Rather than expend
that time, he likely would have relied on his common sense to take judicial notice of the fact
that not all rain hats are alike. Today, however, a judge need only take a few moments to
confirm his intuition by conducting a basic Internet search.
Id., quoted in Barger, supra note 124, at 43.
146. See generally Larsen, supra note 18.
147. 526 U.S. 137, 142-43 (1999).
148. Id. Justice Breyer attributed the drawing to MIKE MAVRIGIAN, PERFORMANCE WHEELS &
TIRES 81, 83 (1998).
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the middle-schooler "would not have been the first person to
conceal pills in her undergarments. .. Nor will she be the last
after today's decision, which announces the safest place to se-
crete [sic] contraband in school."155
Judges are not only influenced by sources they locate outside the briefs. Le-
gal realists know that judges are influenced also by their own cultural knowledge
and life experience. Personal experiences have left their footprints in some of the
Court's most influential opinions. Justice Stewart's famous pornography test ar-
ticulated in Jacobellis v. Ohio ("I know it when I see it"l 56) likely was influenced
by his World War II experience as a Navy lieutenant.' Woodward and Arm-
strong describe Stewart's experience of the varieties of pornography:
He had seen it during World War II, when he served as a Navy lieuten-
ant. In Casablanca, as watch officer for his ship, he had seen his men
bring back locally produced pornography. He knew the difference be-
tween that hardest of hard core and much of what came to the Court. He
called it his "Casablanca Test."" 8
In another well-known example, Justice Blackmun traveled to the Mayo
Clinic to conduct his own medical research before writing his opinion in Roe v.
Wade.' 9 He wrote to the Mayo Clinic librarian to inquire whether "your well-
equipped library [would] have anything about the history of abortion. You can
imagine why I ask."1 60
We know about these examples because they have been the subject of inves-
tigation, and of course they are but speculations about a complex process. But
the speculations are reliable enough to serve as the visible tip of a massive ice-
berg. Virtually unknown, and therefore unavailable for refutation and response,
are the influences on judges of standard cultural products such as the books they
have read; the movies they have seen; the experiences of their friends and family
and of themselves; and the attitudes and opinions of social and political groups
with whom they associate and identify.
The Introduction to this Article asserted that constitutional decisions should
not be made in a hermetically sealed environment. As this Part has observed and
as the next section more fully explains, we need not worry. There is no such thing
155. Id. at 390.
156. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
157. BOB WOODWARD & ScorT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 194
(1979).
158. Id.
159. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129-62 (1973).
160. Joseph F. Kobylka, Tales from the Blackmun Papers: A Fuller Appreciation of Harry
Blackmun 's Judicial Legacy, 70 MO. L. REv. 1075, 1088 n.89 (2005) (quoting Harry A. Blackmun Papers,
box 151).
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as a hermetically sealed judicial environment. As it turns out, the problem may
not be too much information, but rather too little. Voices briefs do their work in
the midst of extra-legal judicial fact-finding and in the context of a judge's preex-
isting cultural knowledge and life experience. The advocacy process must be able
to supplement or challenge that extra-record information, for it is otherwise un-
reachable. It is time to explore just what voices briefs seek to do and how they
seek to do it.
IV. How NON-PARTY STORIES PERSUADE 6 1
We inhabit a nomos-a normative universe. We constantly create and
maintain a world of right and wrong, of lawful and unlawful, of valid
and void... . For every constitution there is an epic, for each decalogue
a scripture.
-Robert Cover62
Robert Cover was among the first to point out the world-creating role of
narrative, but in his era, little cognitive work explained how this normative uni-
verse works. Such is not the case today. As Steven Winter writes:
There is a virtual revolution going on within the cognitive sciences....
[New cognitive science research] alters the contours of entire debates in
disciplines such as law . . .. The promise of cognitive theory lies pre-
cisely in its ability to make explicit the unconscious criteria and cogni-
tive operations that structure and constitute our judgment. It is by laying
bare these cognitive structures and their impact on our reasoning that we
can best aid legal actors-whether advocates or decision-makers-who
wish to understand the law better so that they can act more effectively.163
These unconscious operations take the form of schemas-preexisting cog-
nitive patterns providing interpretive frameworks through which we perceive and
judge the world.164 A schema organizes people, places, and events into roles the
schema has made familiar.16' The resulting perceptions seem to be natural and
161. A version of this sub-section appeared in Linda H. Edwards, Where Do the Prophets Stand?
Hamdi, Myth, and the Master's Tools, 13 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 43, 49-53 (2013).
162. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term - Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARv. L. REV. 4,4 (1983).
163. STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MINDxi-xiii (2001).
164. The term "schema" can have different meanings in different disciplines. Here, the term is used
in its rhetorical sense as an embedded knowledge structure rather than, for instance, as an "expert" schema
referring to a heuristic or framework used as a shortcut by experts in a specific field. Richard K. Sherwin,
The Narrative Construction of Legal Reality, 18 VT. L. REv. 681, 700-01 (1994); see generally Linda L.
Berger, How Embedded Knowledge Structures Affect Judicial Decision Making: A Rhetorical Analysis of
Metaphor, Narrative, and Imagination in Child Custody Disputes, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISc. L.J. 259 (2009).
165. Berger, supra note 164, at 265.
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true-simply an objective observation of the state of affairs. Once within the
frame of such a cognitive structure, escape is difficult. The schema both high-
lights information that seems consistent with the schema, and hides inconsistent
information.'6 6 Thus, the structure reinforces its own inherent cultural values and
perspectives.
A culture's master stories provide the most common and effective sche-
mas.167 We are hard-wired to organize the world into stories,168 and there is rea-
son to suspect that deductive reasoning processes arise derivatively from such
preexisting frames.'69 Cultural stories mediate new events, infusing them with
shared social meaning.7 0 They channel new events into that well-worn path.171
The outcome will seem both true and inevitable.172
Critical theorists have observed schema in action for years.'7 1 What may be
less well-known, however, is the startling finding that a schema does its world-
creating work before we become aware of the information it organizes. In other
words, as a matter of biology, it may not be possible to perceive a schema-free
set of new facts. Research by University of Texas neurobiologist Dr. David Eng-
leman demonstrates the point:
Engleman's research has shown that the brain lives just a little bit in the
past. A human brain collects a lot of information and then pauses for a
moment to organize it before releasing the processed information to the
conscious mind. "Now" actually happened a little while (several milli-
seconds) ago.
166. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 10-11 (1980); see generally
WINTER, supra note 163.
167. Berger, supra note 164, at 268; Judith Olans Brown, Lucy A. Williams & Phyllis Tropper
Baumann, The Mythogenesis of Gender: Judicial Images of Women in Paid and Unpaid Labor, 6 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 457, 457-58 (1996).
168. JEROME BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING 45 (1990); ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL
159 (1999)
169. Berger, supra note 164, at 268; Brown, Williams, & Baumann, supra note 167, at 457-58; J.
Christopher Rideout, Storytelling, Narrative Rationality, and Legal Persuasion, 14 J. LEGAL WRITING
INST. 54, 57-59 (2008). See generally Linda H. Edwards, The Convergence ofAnalogical and Dialectic
Imaginations in Legal Discourse, 20 LEGAL STUD. F. 7 (1996).
170. See generally Edwards, supra note 161; see also Jennifer Sheppard, Once Upon a Time, Hap-
pily Ever After, and in a Galaxy Far, Far Away: Using Narrative to Fill the Cognitive Gap Left by Over-
reliance on Pure Logic in Appellate Briefs and Motion Memoranda, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 255, 259-
63 (2010).
171. WINTER, supra note 163, at 106-13; Steven L. Winter, Making the Familiar Conventional
Again, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1607, 1629 (2001); see also Berger, supra note 164, at 268 (analyzing how
familiar knowledge structures impact custody decisions).
172. Berger, supra note 164, at 265; see, e.g., David F. Chavkin, Fuzzy Thinking: A Borrowed Par-
adigm for Crisper Lawyering, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 163, 167, 177-83 (1997) (explaining how prior
knowledge and experience operate to fill in the gaps of stories and thus create particular interpretations).
173. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative,
87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2418 (1989).
60 [Vol. 29:29
Telling Stories in the Supreme Court
To demonstrate this for yourself, tap your finger on a tabletop at arm's
length. Light travels faster than sound. So the sight actually reached you
a few milliseconds before the sound. However, your brain synchronized
the two to make them seem simultaneous. The same thing happens when
you watch someone's lips move as they speak. During these microsec-
ond pauses the brain/mind constructs a plausible story to make the in-
coming information make sense. Sensory impressions enter the brain;
stories exit to the conscious mind for interpretation and action. A signif-
icant part of what the brain does for the conscious mind is structure ex-
perience into story.174
In other words, at the moment we become aware of a set of facts, we have
already adopted a perspective. The question is not whether we see the situation
through a lens, but which lens focuses our view. The danger is, of course, that
we are often oblivious to our own unconscious frames. If a judge does not un-
derstand that there is more than one "true" story, the judge will remain uncon-
sciously captive to a set of unexamined assumptions based on preexisting narra-
tive schema.
The idea that there exists no neutral moment-no moment when a judge's
perception is unaffected by one cultural frame or another-casts an illuminating
light on the purpose of a voices brief. The stories in a voices brief do not attempt
to manipulate a previously neutral judge. The question is not whether to impose
a partisan frame but rather whether a preexisting, unexamined partisan frame will
remain impervious to challenge.
Attempting to counteract the world-creating influence of a preexisting cul-
tural narrative is a difficult task, but it may be critically important. Not only is it
necessary to unsettle a preexisting schema before a judge can recognize other
possible perspectives, but, ironically, the more we value traditional merits argu-
ments, the more important it may be to find a place for narrative persuasion. To
understand why, we need to learn some terms and concepts.
Cognitive studies have examined how human beings evaluate competing ar-
guments. Perhaps the most influential single theory of the persuasive effects of
messages is a concept called the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM).1 7 ' The
174. KENDALL HAVEN, STORY PROOF: THE SCIENCE BEHIND THE STARTLING POWER OF STORY 22
(2007).
175. E-mail from Michael D. Slater to author (Feb. 9, 2017) (on file with the author). Dr. Slater is
a Distinguished Professor of Social and Behavioral Science and Professor of Communication at The Ohio
State University and a recognized ELM scholar whose Google Scholar citation count totaled 8,434 as of
March 2017. Michael D. Slater, GOOGLE SCHOLAR, https://scholar.google.com/cita-
tions?user-1 ncvrH4AAAAJ&hl-en. ELM pioneers include Dr. Richard E. Petty (Distinguished Univer-
sity Professor of Psychology at The Ohio State University) and Dr. John T. Cacioppo (Tiffany and Mar-
garet Blake Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago, Department of Psychiatry and
Behavioral Neuroscience). Drs. Petty and Cacioppo wrote the seminal paper on ELM in 1986. The Elab-
oration Likelihood Model ofPersuasion, in 19 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 123-
205 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1986). This paper alone had been cited by other scholars more than 7,400
times as of March 2017. The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion, GOOGLE SCHOLAR,
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ELM identifies a spectrum for how a message recipient (in our case, a reader)
processes an argument.176 At opposite ends of the spectrum are central route
processing and peripheral route processing.177 Central route processing is
marked by careful, critical evaluation of the merits. A reader using central route
processing tests the advocate's arguments and also generates her own thoughts
about the merits.178 Central route processing is the kind of traditional merits anal-
ysis we hope a judge will use as the core of judicial decision making.
Peripheral route processing is marked by low(er) elaboration. A reader using
low elaboration relies more on familiar attitudes and patterns of thought and less
on traditional forms of merits analysis.179 Professor Kathryn Stanchi, the leading
scholar in applying ELM to legal advocacy, describes peripheral processing as
"less thoughtful and engaged" and as "often based on heuristics or shortcuts un-
related to the substantive merits of the message."80 Peripheral route processing
reduces the role of traditional merits arguments, an unappealing result for a judi-
cial system that should rely heavily on authoritative text, precedent, analogy, and
policy.
But advocates may be able to move a judge closer to high elaboration.181 To
understand how, we turn to the science of involvement. Reader involvement, as
it turns out, affects the impact of an argument. Scholars have studied two kinds
of involvement that are especially relevant here. Decision makers experience
outcome-relevant involvement when they perceive a personal stake in the is-
sue-for instance, when the decision will affect themselves or those for whom
they care.182 Decision makers experience value-relevant involvement when the
https://scholar.google.com/citations?view-op=viewcitation&hl=en&user-y4MYDxQAAAAJ&cita-
tion for view-y4MYDxQAAAAJ:SnGPuo6Feq8C. In 2012, Drs. Petty and Cacioppo published Com-
munication and Persuasion: Central and Peripheral Routes to Attitude Change, which already had been
cited more than 8,100 times as of March 2017. COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION: CENTRAL AND
PERIPHERAL ROUTES TO ATTITUDE CHANGE, GOOGLE SCHOLAR, https://scholar.google.com/cita-
tions?view.op-viewscitation&hl=en&user-y4MYDxQAAAAJ&cita-
tion for view-y4MYDxQAAAAJ:u5HHmVD-uO8C.
176. Michael D. Slater, Involvement as Goal-Directed Strategic Processing: Extending the Elabo-
ration Likelihood Model, in THE PERSUASION HANDBOOK: DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
175 (James Price Dillard & Michael Pfau eds., 2002). While this section will cite to some of the original
sources, those sources first came to my attention in Professor Kathryn Stanchi's work, and she deserves
general attribution for this entire section. See generally Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Science of Persuasion:
An Initial Exploration, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 411.
177. DANIEL O'KEEFE, PERSUASION: THEORY AND RESEARCH 139-41 (1990); Steve Booth-Butter-
field & Jennifer Welbourne, The Elaboration Likelihood Model: Its Impact on Persuasion Theory and
Research, in THE PERSUASION HANDBOOK, supra note 176, at 157-58.
178. Booth-Butterfield & Welboume, supra note 177, at 156-57.
179. Id. at 156.
180. Stanchi, supra note 176, at 436.
181. Booth-Butterfield & Welboume, supra note 177, at 160 (finding that message-recipient in-
volvement can be "situationally induced").
182. Slater, supra note 176, at 177; Stanchi, supra note 176, at 440-41 (noting that a recipient's
thoughtfulness increases as the level of personal relevance increases). See generally Andrew J. Cook,
Kevin Moore & Gary D. Steel, The Taking ofa Position: A Reinterpretation ofthe Elaboration Likelihood
Model, 34 J. THEORY SOC. BEHAV. 315, 316 (2004).
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issue is more distant, impacting instead abstract personal values.183 A message
recipient can be influenced simultaneously and to varying degrees by each kind
of involvement.184
Studies show that the kind of involvement a reader feels plays a role in how
the reader processes information. Outcome-relevant involvement leads to greater
central route processing.185 Thus, readers who feel a personal stake in the matter,
perhaps because the outcome will affect individuals they care for, will tend to
devote more attention to traditional merits arguments, actively testing the ideas
presented and generating their own responses. Value-relevant involvement, how-
ever, encourages peripheral processing.186 Value-relevant readers tend to process
information peripherally, in more of a "knee-jerk" response,'87 with less attention
to an argument's strength on the merits. In fact, Michael D. Slater, a nationally-
recognized ELM researcher, has commented that an appeal to values may be a
way to "short-circuit intelligent debate."'8 8
Here is how that short-circuiting works. When the reader's pre-existing val-
ues are consistent with the advocate's position, the value-relevant reader is likely
to embrace the advocate's traditional merits arguments with little question.189
But if the reader's preexisting values are inconsistent, a strong merits argument
actually can be counterproductive. Because it threatens the reader's values, a
strong merits argument can arouse resistance and actually move the reader fur-
ther away' 90-a kind of boomerang effect. A resistant value-involved reader re-
jects the merits argument and generates her own counterarguments. '9 Worse yet,
the unsuccessful merits argument might even trigger an inoculation effect, in
which the reader develops what are essentially antibodies to the argument, mak-
ing her even more resistant to future merits arguments.'92 Judicial decision mak-
ing should value traditional merits arguments, not discount them, but a strong
183. Slater, supra note 176, at 177. A third kind of involvement is "response involvement," which
stems from knowing that the decision will be public and that others will form opinions about whether it is
correct. Stanchi, supra note 176, at 441. That kind of involvement may well be relevant here, but it has
not been sufficiently studied to support speculation about how it might function in ajudicial setting.
184. Stanchi, supra note 176, at 441.
185. Id. at 444.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 452.
188. Id. at 441.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 441-42 (referring to the effect as "value-protective processing").
191. Id.
192. The theory of inoculation posits that an advocate can encourage resistance to opposing argu-
ments by exposing the message recipient to a less effective version of the argument. Inoculation has not
been tested in combination with a value-relevant reader who generates counter-arguments, but the two
theories may well interact, resulting in an even more negative reaction to traditional merits arguments. See
Quentin Brogdon, Inoculating Against Bad Facts: Brilliant Trial Strategy or Misguided Dogma?, 63 TEx.
B.J. 443, 447 (2000); Michael J. Saks, Flying Blind in the Courtroom: Trying Cases Without Knowing
What Works or Why, 101 YALE L.J. 1177,1187-1188 (1992) (reviewing ROBERT H. KLONOFF & PAUL L.
COLBY, SPONSORSHIP STRATEGY: EVIDENTIARY TACTICS FOR WINNING JURY TRIALS (1990)); see gen-
erally Kathryn M. Stanchi, Playing with Fire: The Science of Confronting Adverse Material in Legal
Advocacy, 60 RUTGERS L. REv. 281 (2008).
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merits argument has exactly the opposite effect on a resistant value-involved
reader.
So far these findings are discouraging but not remarkable. Many lawyers
would view these findings as consistent with their experience. But one finding is
surprising, and it explains why voices briefs can play a useful role. While strong
merits arguments may push a value-involved judge further away, arguments that
include anecdotal (narrative) messages can trigger central-route processing.
Thus, unlike a logically compelling merits argument, anecdotal messages may
allow the advocate to counter the effects of negative preexisting bias.193
For instance, one study divided college students into two groups based on
the degree to which they were inclined to accept the social use of alcohol.194 The
study then compared the effects of messages critical of alcohol use. One message
relied on statistics supporting the negative message about alcohol use. The other
related a short story about the consequences of alcohol use on a fellow student.
As Professor Stanchi explains, "[t]he value-protective message recipients
demonstrated belief change when confronted with the narrative evidence and
were less persuaded by the statistics. The statistics . . . served only to encourage
counter-arguing."'95 The group already predisposed to agree with the message,
however, engaged in "classic central processing" of the statistical evidence.196
The study showed that "statistical evidence is superior for reinforcing beliefs of
those already inclined to believe the message, and anecdotal evidence [personal
narrative] is superior for influencing a much more difficult audience-those who
disagree with the message."l97
How might anecdotal argument work in a judicial setting? Consider a judge
who values a pro-life stance. In an abortion case, this judge might not experience
outcome involvement because he has never needed an abortion himself and, as
far as he knows, neither has anyone with whom he identifies. When he thinks of
those who might need an abortion, he may think of a set of stereotypes about
women who are sexually irresponsible-people unlike himself or those with
whom he identifies. Thus, lacking any outcome-relevant stake in the question,
the judge may rely more completely on his preexisting pro-life values. The pri-
mary purpose of a voices brief is to expand that judge's realm of identification
to include groups not previously a part of the judge's personal world. A resistant,
value-involved judge is likely to think "this case is about them" rather than "this
case is about some of us." Voices briefs can introduce the judge to these "others"
in order to encourage meaningful merits analysis for all parties. Otherwise, some
parties may receive a different kind of justice produced by a different kind of
legal analysis than that offered to other parties.
193. Stanchi, supra note 176, at 442.
194. Slater, supra note 176, at 184.
195. Stanchi, supra note 176, at 442 (citing Slater, supra note 176, at 180, 184, 188).
196. Id.
197. Slater, supra note 176, at 185.
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In fact, a robust scholarship supports the idea that judicial outcomes can be
negatively affected by "us-them" thinking. In recent years, scholars have pro-
duced important work on the role of emotion and the necessity of empathy and
moral imagination in judging (and therefore in advocacy).1 98 For example, Terry
Maroney has debunked erroneous negative views of emotion and explored legit-
imate roles for emotion in judicial decision making.199 In The Persistent Cultural
Script ofJudicial Dispassion, Professor Maroney provides a powerful defense of
empathy's role in judging. Susan Bandes has defended the role of emotion in
judging, critiqued problematic uses of emotion, and explored the necessity of
moral imagination200 in legal deliberations.201 No lesser light than Martha Nuss-
baum, one of the nation's most valued public intellectuals, has explored the im-
portance of moral imagination and empathy in law.2 02 Mark Johnson, another
leading scholar of philosophy, has also argued for the importance of moral im-
agination in all human deliberations,203 and leading scholars in cognitive linguis-
tics have deconstructed seemingly unassailable rational assumptions.204 Other
legal scholars have weighed in on these issues as well, identifying legitimate
198. See generally Terry A. Maroney, A Field Evolves: Introduction to the Special Section on Law
and Emotion, 8 EMOTION REV. 3 (2016).
199. See, e.g., Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Common Sense as Constitutional Law, 62 VAND. L.
REV. 849 (2009); Terry Maroney, The Emotionally Intelligent Judge: A New (and Realistic) Ideal, 49 CT.
REv. 100 (2013); Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Regulation and Judicial Behavior, 99 CALIF. L. REV.
1485 (2011); Terry A. Maroney, The Persistent Cultural Script ofJudicial Dispassion, 99 CALIF. L. REV.
629 (2011); Terry A. Maroney, Why Choose? A Response to Rachlinski, Wistrich, & Guthrie's "Heart
Versus Head: Do Judges Follow the Law or Follow Their Feelings?," 93 TEx. L. REV. 317 (2015); Terry
A. Maroney & Philip Ackerman-Lieberman, "As a Father Shows Compassion for His Children ": Ancient
and Contemporary Perspectives on Judicial Empathy, 3 J.L. RELIGION & ST. 240 (2014); Terry A.
Maroney & James J. Gross, The Ideal of the Dispassionate Judge: An Emotion Regulation Perspective, 6
EMOTION REV. 142 (2014).
200. "Moral imagination is the ability to understand one's own limitations, the limitations of per-
spective, the range of values at stake, and the possibilities for change inherent in the situation. It is the
ability to understand that things might be ordered differently, a way out of arid formalism and closed
systems." Susan A. Bandes, Moral Imagination in Judging, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 24 (2011). Fundamental
to moral imagination is the effort to understand the perspectives of others. Id.
201. See, e.g., THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999); Susan Bandes, Fear Factor:
The Role ofMedia in Covering and Shaping the Death Penalty, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 585 (2004); Susan
Bandes, What's Love Got to Do With It?, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 97 (2001); Susan A. Bandes,
Civil Liberties and the "Imaginative Sustenance" ofJewish Culture, 16 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 238
(2015); Susan A. Bandes, Empathetic Judging and the Rule of Law, 2009 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO
133; Susan A. Bandes, Empathy and Article IlI: Judge Weinstein, Cases and Controversies, 64 DEPAUL
L. REV. 317 (2015); Bandes, supra note 200; Susan A. Bandes, Moral Shock and Legal Education, 65 J.
LEGALEDUC. 298 (2015); Susan A. Bandes & Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotion and the Law, 8 ANN. REV.
L. & Soc. SC. 161 (2012); Susan A. Bandes & Jessica M. Salerno, Emotion, Proof and Prejudice: The
Cognitive Science of Gruesome Photos and Victim Impact Statements, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1003 (2014).
202. See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW
(2004); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS (2001);
Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 269 (1996).
203. See generally MARK JOHNSON, MORAL IMAGINATION: IMPLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE
FOR ETHICS (1993).
204. See generally GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK TURNER, MORE THAN COOL REASON: A FIELD
GUIDE TO POETIC METAPHOR (1989).
2017] 65
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
roles for empathy and emotion in legal deliberations.205 Scholars of law and nar-
rative have pointed out the role of stories in establishing narrative identifica-
tion,206 and rhetoric scholars have pointed to the importance of rhetorical listen-
ing-the act of listening to learn another's point of view rather than to formulate
an argumentative response.207
It is important not to over-claim here. First, no responsible scholar would
argue that a flood of storytelling would or should overcome all other judicial
influences. Judges must do more than understand the perspectives of those with
experiences different from their own. First and foremost, they must analyze con-
trolling text and precedent, account for other compelling policy concerns, and
remain true to the role of the judiciary in a three-branch system of government.
Second, a relentless flood of moving stories may reduce or even reverse the
stories' intended effect. In at least some settings, repeated traumatic stories can
eventually produce indifference to accompanying appeals.208 For instance,
judges who have heard countless capital appeals may become weary and even-
tually immune to the tragic scenarios commonly presented by defense lawyers.209
205. See, e.g., Peter Brandon Bayer, Not Interaction But Melding-The "Russian Dressing" Theory
ofEmotions: An Explanation ofthe Phenomenology ofEmotions and Rationality with Suggested Related
Maxims for Judges and Other Legal Decision Makers, 52 MERCER L. REv. 1033 (2001); Justin D'Arms,
Empathy and Evaluative Inquiry, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1467 (2000); Jamal Greene, Pathetic Argument
in Constitutional Law, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1389 (2013); Lynne N. Henderson, Legality andEmpathy, 85
MICH. L. REv. 1574 (1987); Peter H. Huang & Christopher J. Anderson, A Psychology ofEmotional Legal
Decision Making: Revulsion and Saving Face in Legal Theory and Practice, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1045
(2006) (reviewing NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 202); Dan M. Kahan & Donald
Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 149 (2006); Laura E. Little,
Negotiating the Tangle of Law and Emotion, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 974 (2001); Andrea McArdle, Using a
Narrative Lens To Understand Empathy and How it Matters in Judging, 9 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC
173 (2012); Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Impartial Judge: Detachment or Passion?, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 605
(1996).
206. Linda H. Edwards, The Humanities in the Law School Curriculum: Courtship and Consum-
mation, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 355, 374 (2016); Linda H. Edwards, Speaking of Stories and Law, 13
J. LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC 157, 165-66 (2016). See generally Copeland, supra note 47 (discussing the
use of narrative to render the lives of LGBT individuals less foreign to mainstream political deliberations);
Edwards, supra note 10.
207. See, e.g., KENNETH BURKE, A RHETORIC OF MOTIVES (1969) (identifying the necessity of nar-
rative identification in persuasion); Linda L. Berger, A Rhetorician's Practical Wisdom, 66 MERCER L.
REV. 459,469-76 (2015); Elizabeth C. Britt, Listening Rhetorically to Defending Our Lives: Identification
and Advocacy in Intimate Partner Abuse, 10 L. CULTURE & HUMAN. 155 (2012); Jack L. Sammons, The
Georgia Crawl, 53 MERCER L. REV. 985, 985-87 (2002).
208. One variety of this phenomenon is "compassion fatigue," which has been defined as fatigue or
apathy "resulting from ... constant appeals from charities." Compassion Fatigue, DICTIONARY.COM,
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/compassion-fatigue?s-t. The ABA has identified compassion fatigue
as a problem for legal professionals who receive repeated requests for assistance from those in traumatic
situations. Compassion Fatigue, AM. B. Ass'N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/lawyerassis-
tance/resources/compassion-fatigue.html.
209. Pamela A. Wilkins, Confronting the Invisible Witness: The Use of Narrative to Neutralize
Capital Jurors' Implicit Racial Biases, 115 W. VA. L. REv. 305, 346 (2012) ("Capital defense lawyers
routinely present evidence regarding the impoverished, abusive, and chaotic families whence their clients
came, hoping jurors will find the client less culpable given the client's childhood deprivations.").
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In some settings, the traditional heartrending mitigation story can backfire, pro-
ducing a reaction opposite from the intended result.2 10 We may well wonder
whether the flood of stories in abortion cases-where twenty-one voices briefs
have been filed-may have reached a saturation point, at least for the Justices
who have been exposed to those briefs over the span of many years. Much more
study remains to be done before we fully understand common human reactions
to repeated tragic stories, an undoubtedly complex question with many human
and situational variables.
Third, involvement studies have not yet focused on judicial decision making,
which is surely different in significant respects. We have a great deal to learn
about how involvement might operate in a judicial setting. But until we learn
more, we should take care to preserve a place for a form of argument that may
help counter the effects of preexisting values bias and maximize the impact of
traditional merits arguments.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE
In addition to the uses we have seen, voices briefs may also play important
roles for at least three other varieties of judicial actors and interested groups.
First, for those most intimately affected by the Court's decision, it is im-
portant to be heard.211 In fact, being heard may be more important in defeat than
in victory. The right to be heard is a fundamental precept of good government,212
but it is more. It is a deep human need.213 That need is at the heart of due process
concepts, all dispute resolution systems, and all effective public discourse. For
example, telling one's story is a core practice of restorative justice, a process
designed to facilitate some degree of healing by inviting affected parties to share
their own stories and to listen to the stories of others.214 Similarly, truth and rec-
210. Id. (taking note of "the more radical position that traditional mitigation discourse may increase
the empathic divide that already exists between white jurors and black capital defendants").
211. This need to be heard is present in all disputes but may be greatest in two situations: (1) in
cases where the outcome will have a deeply personal impact on the intimate lives of those affected; and
(2) in cases where those t lling their stories are living lives vastly different from a judge's experience. To
date, voices briefs have been used almost entirely in cases forming a sub-set of the first category-cases
threatening a woman's control over her own body and cases threatening the deepest of human relation-
ships. See supra text accompanying notes 51-57; see also Appendix.
212. Garcia, supra note 78, at 343-47.
213. See TERESA GODWIN PHELPS, SHATTERED VOICES: LANGUAGE, VIOLENCE, AND THE WORK
OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 4 (2006) (describing the truth commission participants' need for their stories to
be officially heard and acknowledged); RESTORATIVE JUSTICE TODAY: PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 206-
07 (Katherine S. van Wormer & Lorenn Walker eds., 2013) (describing the process of "[u]nearthing the
previously silenced voices of victims" to facilitate healing through storytelling).
214. TONY FOLEY, DEVELOPING RESTORATIVE JUSTICE JURISPRUDENCE: RETHINKING RESPONSES
TO CRIMINAL WRONGDOING 75-95 (2014). Restorative justice encourages "moral learning" through per-
sonal encounters that can "activate [thel process of moral development." Id. at 75.
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onciliation commissions create fora for sharing stories to address the conse-
quences of seriously polarized, painful, and sometimes violent situations.215
Their purposes are many, but they include the recognition of personhood and
dignity. Even if the Court is not persuaded on the merits-in fact, especially
then-those affected need to feel heard.2 16
And winning and losing, after all, are often about more than any single case.
Since most controversial topics come before the Court again and again and since
many Justices will hear multiple cases on topics like abortion or LGBTQ rights,
most sophisticated issue advocates try to do more than win a favorable decision
in the pending case.217 They make arguments today that may bear fruit tomorrow.
Voices briefs can be part of a long-term strategy of persuasion, and judges do
sometimes change their minds. For example, after twenty years of acceptance of
the death penalty, Justice Blackmun famously wrote, in a "rather ordinary case
among many,"218 that "[fjrom this day forward I no longer shall tinker with the
machinery of death."219
Second, voices briefs can serve important roles even for the Justices who
find themselves firmly on one wing of the Court-Justices unlikely to be per-
suaded to change their minds on the merits.220 Voices briefs filed in support of a
Justice's preexisting leaning may provide support for that position, as in the
Obergefell oral argument example.22' And voices briefs filed in support of the
opposite position nonetheless may affect the tone and content of an unfavorable
opinion. Ideally, voices briefs would encourage a Justice to write an opinion that
recognizes and respects opposing views. Opinions that recognize the arguments
on both sides are more persuasive, showing that the Court fairly and seriously
considered all arguments-and persuasion is, after all, one of the most important
purposes of a judicial opinion.
Third, the Court has a responsibility to model better public discourse for this
fractured nation. The Court's opinions should avoid exacerbating the nation's
deep divides. What's more, they should show us how to listen and talk to each
other when we disagree. An opinion that recognizes and respects all positions
can provide a modicum of healing because readers who lose at least will feel
215. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, INT'L JUST. RESOURCE CTR., http://www.ijr-
center.org/cases-before-national-courts/truth-and-reconciliation-commissions/.
216. PHELPS, supra note 213, at 52-73 (explaining the special need for storytelling when the state
cannot grant the relief sought).
217. See Lynn M. Paltrow, Missed Opportuntites in McCorvey v. Hill: The Limits of Pro-Choice
Lawyering, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 194, 201 (2011) ("Winning in the short term . .. is not
always the point.").
218. Linda Greenhouse, Death Penalty Is Renounced by Blackmun, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 1994),
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/23/us/death-penalty-is-renounced-by-blackmun.html.
219. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994).
220. For example, it is unlikely that voices briefs could cause Justice Sotomayor to change her
attitude toward abortion or voter identification regulations, or cause Justice Thomas to change his attitude
toward marriage equality or gun control measures.
221. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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heard, and readers who win may come away with a greater understanding of
those on the other side of the issue.
This discursive process is at the heart of the feminist concept of rhetorical
listening. As modem feminist scholarship explains, rhetorical listening is a con-
scious choice to be open to the perspective of another. Instead of reading merely
to devise a reply, we read to understand another's experience.222 Closely related
to restorative justice,223 rhetorical listening invites affected parties to share their
own stories and to listen to the stories of others, a goal that might be worthy of
more attention when the Court is deciding highly charged issues of constitutional
law.
In recent years, the Court has acknowledged and relied upon a legal concept
of dignity.224 What I am suggesting here is procedural dignity. Procedural dig-
nity applies equally to both sides. A Justice firmly committed to marriage equal-
ity might not understand why opponents want to impose their personal choice as
a matter of law upon others. Reading the brief filed by Same-Sex Attracted Men
and Their Wives in Obergefell might help that Justice understand how the situa-
tion looks to at least some opponents of marriage equality.225 She might sense
that these young men are trying to preserve a world whose structures support
their daily struggle to choose a different life-to marry a woman, have a family
with her, and live in a community that validates their choice. Such a Justice might
even imagine a sense of desperation beneath e stories of these young people as
they try so hard to hang on to a world fast slipping away. When that Justice sits
down to write her opinion, she might be more inclined to treat those young peo-
ple with respect and empathy, even as she rules against their arguments.
To be clear, the assertion here is not that the Supreme Court should become
a forum for touchy-feely therapy, nor that allowing public storytelling will mag-
ically heal the deep divides that afflict the nation's common life. Rather, while
going about its normal deliberative process, the Court might choose to be more
aware of the effect of its language on other public discourse. A caustic tone in
Supreme Court opinions is not helpful either for democratic governance in gen-
eral or for the public's respect for the Court itself.226
222. See generally KRISTA RATCLIFFE, RHETORICAL LISTENING: IDENTIFICATION, GENDER,
WHITENESS (2005).
223. See supra notes 214-216 and accompanying text.
224. See Elizabeth B. Cooper, The Power of Dignity, 84 FORDHAM L. REv. 3 (2015) (tracing an
expanding legal concept of dignity through the holdings of four cases raising issues of LGBT rights).
225. Brief of Amici Curiae Same-Sex Attracted Men and Their Wives in Support of Respondents
& Affirmance, supra note 48.
226. Greenhouse, supra note 41 (citing a poll showing that more people disapprove of the Supreme
Court (50%) than approve of it (45%)).
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VI. THE THEORETICAL PLACE OF NON-PARTY STORIES
If voices briefs can serve these crucial roles, it becomes all the more im-
portant to ask whether these briefs are precluded by procedural rules or legal
theory. As this Part will show, they are not. No formal rule limits the filing of
any kind of amicus brief, but we still must ask whether these briefs run afoul of
long-established principles and test them against traditional theories of legal rea-
soning, jurisprudence, and constitutional interpretation. The treatment here of
this expansive question must be introductory only, but can begin what should
ultimately become a more robust discussion.
A. Basic Forms ofLegal Reasoning
Most legal analyses begin by considering what the governing rule or stand-
ard might mean in a given situation. Perhaps surprisingly, voices briefs can play
a supporting role in analyzing a constitutional standard. The Thornburgh
NARAL brief is instructive.227 In Meyer v. Nebraska,228 the 1923 case challeng-
ing a state law restricting foreign-language ducation, the Court declared:
Without doubt [liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily re-
straint but also the right of the individual ... to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, es-
tablish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges
long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.229
The NARAL brief used these six aspects of liberty as the organizing struc-
ture for its stories. Beneath headings for each aspect of liberty, the brief shared
stories demonstrating how the right to an abortion implicates that liberty interest.
The final subsection, discussing "those privileges long recognized at common
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men,"230 shared stories
of women simply trying to live the kinds of fulfilling and responsible lives men
could take for granted.231 As one woman explained:
I kept being struck by the ultimate unfairness of it all. I could not con-
ceive of any event which would so profoundly impact upon any man.
Surely my husband would experience some additional financial burden,
227. NARAL Brief, supra note 27; see generally Edwards, supra note 10.
228. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
229. NARAL Brief, supra note 27, at 22-23 (quoting Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399).
230. Id. at 28 (quoting Meyer, 262 U.S at 399).
231. Id. at 28-30.
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and additional "fatherly" chores, but his whole future plan was not hos-
tage to this unchosen, undesired event. Basically his life would remain
the same progression of ordered events as before.232
As we have seen, many stories in voices briefs also support policy-based
reasoning. They demonstrate the harm of one possible constitutional result or the
other. For example, in Thornburgh, the Reagan Administration's Solicitor Gen-
eral articulated the question at hand as whether to "return the law to the condi-
tion" before Roe.233 NARAL's brief sought to remind the Court of "the condi-
tion" 234 before Roe:
Before this Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, state governments were
free to substitute their political judgments for the personal, moral judg-
ments of women and the medical judgments of doctors.... Women ob-
tained illegal abortions despite the illegality and grave risks involved, as
these excerpts from the letters reveal:
I remember Tijuana. I remember bugs crawling on walls as I waited
for the "second part" of my abortion to take place.. .. I was sent o
a "hotel" to wait three hours-a stinking cesspool of urine, sweat,
filthy sheets and bugs-unidentifiable crawling creatures all over
the walls, floors and crevices. . . . Where else could I have gone in
1963?235
Finally, voices briefs may play an especially important role when the Court
is considering a broad holding-a holding that will apply to many individuals in
a variety of situations. In such cases, courts typically create and analyze hypo-
theticals. As Akhil Amar has observed:
Hypotheticals are the grist of legal reasoning and form an implicit or
explicit part of virtually every legal case ever decided and every legal
issue ever analyzed outside a courtroom. Even if a judge is sure that the
plaintiff in the case at hand-call it case A-deserves to win, the judge
must decide how broadly or narrowly to rule. If she adopts a broad rule,
plaintiffs in later cases B and C will also deserve to win under the sweep-
ing logic she announces. By contrast, a narrow rule in case A might
mean that plaintiffs in later cases B and C will likely or surely lose. ...
232. Idat 29.
233. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants at 24, Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (Nos. 84-495 and 84-1379),
1985 WL 669620.
234. NARAL Brief, supra note 27, at 8.
235. NARAL Brief, supra note 27, at 8-9.
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[A] good judge will think carefully about these now-hypothetical cases
in crafting the proper rule for the case at hand-case A.236
If hypotheticals-the stories of fictional non-parties and situations created
entirely by the Court's lively imagination-have long been accepted as "the grist
of' traditional judicial reasoning, the actual stories of real-life non-parties are
surely appropriate as well.237 Like hypotheticals, non-party stories convey a
sense of those who may be affected by the Court's decision. Surely it is at least
as helpful to consider actual individuals as it is to consider imaginary individu-
als. 23 8
B. Legal Theory
The broad tent of legal realism, today's most widely accepted jurisprudential
theory, sees law as the indeterminate product of a relatively subjective process.
Holmes's famous description of early legal realism ("The life of the law has not
been logic: it has been experience")239 strikes a familiar note in the context of
voices briefs, which present the Court with human experience. Legal realists be-
lieve that law is made by people as the need arises.24 0 Realism sees law as re-
flecting historical, social, political, anthropological, psychological, and eco-
nomic factors. One might say that legal realism forever unmasked the humanity,
complexity, and malleability of the law.241 Stories of human experience can
touch all the factors that, in the realist's view, combine to account for a legal
outcome.
236. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY xiii-xiv (2012).
237. Id. at xiii.
238. In fact, this imaginative process has a recognized narrative pedigree. Gary Saul Morson, a
literary critic and a leading scholar of Russian and comparative literature, has dubbed this activity "sides-
hadowing." GARY S. MORSON, NARRATIVE AND FREEDOM: THE SHADOWS OF TIME 6-9 (1994). Sides-
hadowing defines a field of possible stories, not merely what did happen in a particular case but what
might have happened. These other possible stories shadow the actual stories and demand adjudicative
attention, freeing the law from captivity by the stories of the present litigants. See Edwards, supra note
169, at 26 (discussing the role of "sideshadowing" in enlaring policy considerations); see also LINDA H.
EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS (4th ed. 2015) (providing a more general description of the
history of legal theory in America).
239. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 3 (Harvard Univ. Press 2009) (1881);
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to The Legal Pro-
cess, in HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW li, lv-lviii (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
240. CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS: JUSTICE HOLMES AND HIS FAMILY
275 (2007) ("[A] good judge unconsciously predicts a law according to the result it will have upon the
community at large.").
241. As one scholar noted, realism's critique of formalism "cut so deeply into the premises of Amer-
ican legal thought that no amount of enlightened policy making and informed situation sense could ever
really put Humpty Dumpty together again." Elizabeth Mensch, The History ofMainstream Legal Thought,
in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 27 (David Kairys ed., 1982).
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Another jurisprudential school-legal process-is seldom mentioned ex-
pressly in current jurisprudence but has had a lasting influence on legal theory
and law. The legal process school values neutral, fair standards for how decisions
are made:242 judges should curb their own preferences in favor of neutrality. At
first glance, the concern for a neutral process might suggest hat we should leave
narrative out of the picture, but since the court's legal interpretation will bind
parties and non-parties alike, fairness requires a voice for non-parties as well.
And as Section V explained, cognitive studies indicate that the best way to min-
imize inevitable subjectivities may be to expand-not contract-the pool of sto-
ries.243 If so, the paramount concerns of the legal process school would be best
served by preserving a place for voices briefs.
The critical schools (critical legal studies, critical race theory, and feminist
legal theory) support the use of voices briefs as well. Critical theory considers
law to be produced largely from the perspectives of those in power.2" It views
legal reasoning as a post hoc rationalization rather than a method of decision
making.245 Therefore, instead of articulated rules, which are, after all, simply po-
litical artifacts, critical theorists turn to narratives about the experiences of mar-
ginalized groups.246 Voices briefs can be the vehicle for relating those stories.
Narrative has a particularly close relationship with feminist theory. For over
thirty years, feminist scholars have recognized narrative's key role in women's
moral choices. In 1982, Carol Gilligan published her groundbreaking book, In a
Diferent Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development, in which
242. BAILEY KUKLIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL PRIMER 159 (1994).
243. See discussion supra Part IV. On a similar note, voices briefs can help to address the inherent
advantage of organizational plaintiffs, who have complete freedom to choose the most appealing individ-
uals to become the named plaintiffs and therefore the human faces of the litigation. Non-party stories also
can help to level the playing field when the issues affect marginalized or unappealing groups or implicate
social and political issues on which judges will already have a preexisting leaning if not a confirmed
opinion, thus enhancing procedural fairness.
244. See Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Le-
gitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331, 1335 (1988) ("[A]ntidiscrimination law
represents an ongoing ideological struggle in which the occasional winners harness the moral, coercive,
consensual power of law."); see also KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: AN
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 129-33 (1996).
245. See, e.g., PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE: STUDIES IN LINGUISTICS, RHETORIC AND
LEGAL ANALYSIS ix (1987) (arguing in favor of a "critical concept of legal discourse as a language of
power, as the pursuit of control over meaning and as instrument and expression of domination.");
VANDEVELDE supra note 244, at 131 ("CLS scholars view legal doctrine as constituting an elaborate
facade of legitimacy and inevitability that masks the political and contingent nature of judicial deci-
sions.").
246. For example, in The Alchemy of Race and Rights, Patricia Williams eschews the traditional
academic style in favor of a form of personal diary written in the first-person and filled with personal and
sometimes emotional anecdotes and reactions, often illustrating her points from her own experience.
PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991). Her very choice of style conveys a
jurisprudential point, although it precludes easy summary or proof-texting citations to her theses. See also
Edwards, Speaking ofStories and Law, supra note 206, at 160-63; see generally Edwards, supra note 161.
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women's stories were treated for the first time as an important part of moral de-
velopment and decision making.247 In 1986, four developmental psychologists
published Women's Ways of Knowing: The Development of Self Voice, and
Mind, in which voice plays a crucial role in women's methods of constructing
knowledge.248 If narrative is instrumental in meaning-making for women, the
silencing of narrative249 is a potentially gendered act.250 Thus, if we want a judi-
cial system that dispenses justice to all its citizens, including women, we should
think long and hard before silencing stories in the judicial process.
C. Theories of Constitutional Interpretation
In constitutional cases, the most relevant theoretical questions often involve
theories of constitutional interpretation rather than more general theories of ju-
risprudence. Many scholars identify interpretive bases by analyzing long-ac-
cepted judicial practice-a kind of Aristotelian process in the sense that it ob-
serves what is being done and works up the ladder of abstraction from there. For
these scholars, constitutional interpretation is a rhetorical practice, and the inter-
pretive methods grow from the practice itself.251
For example, Philip Bobbitt has identified six interpretive norms (modali-
ties) to infuse underdetermined constitutional language with meaning: the histor-
ical, textual, structural, doctrinal, ethical, and prudential modalities.252 Bobbitt's
ethical and prudential modalities are the most natural theoretical homes for
247. As part of studying women's moral development, for perhaps the first time in social science
literature, Gilligan's book allowed women to tell their own stories in their own voices and with their own
dignity and integrity. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982).
248. MARY FIELD BELENKY ET AL., WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF,
VOICE, AND MIND (1986). The book identifies five epistemological methods and their roles in women's
mental processing. The first is silence. Id. at 23-34. According to the authors, when women are silent, they
tend to experience themselves as unable to construct or process knowledge and instead as subject to the
authority of others. Women spoke of the importance of having a voice, both metaphorically and literally.
They spoke of being silenced, feeling "deaf and dumb," and having no words, in contrast to speaking up,
talking and listening, and saying what they mean. Id. at 24. By contrast, "[c]onstructed knowledge," an-
other epistemological method, values contextual knowledge and both subjective and objective strategies
of understanding. Id. at 131-52
249. RATCLIFFE, supra note 222, at 79 ("[D]ysfunctional silence ... resincrib[es] a powerful cul-
tural desire in the U.S. not to talk publicly and cross-culturally about how gender and race intersect.").
250. BELENKY ET AL., supra note 248, at 17-20.
251. lan Bartrum, The Modalities of Constitutional Argument: A Primer, in LINDA H. EDWARDS,
READINGS IN PERSUASION: BRIEFS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 203-215 (2012).
252. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12-13 (1991). An even more flexible ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation arises from the idea of the "living" or "evolving" constitution. Pro-
ponents of a living constitution understand the document to be designed to change with the times. Terms
like "due process" are thought to establish fundamental values to be applied by contemporary judges to
contemporary times. See generally DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010); see also
KATHERINE A. CURRIER & THOMAS E. EIMERMANN, THE STUDY OF LAW: A CRITICAL THINKING
APPROACH 135 (2009). If voices briefs can play a legitimate role in a modalities approach, they are even
more certainly legitimate in a living constitution approach.
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voices briefs. The ethical modality looks to fundamental moral commitments re-
flected in the Constitution, and the prudential modality balances competing in-
terests (costs and benefits), attempting to accommodate those interests in a useful
and reasonable way. 253 The stories in voices briefs demonstrate the human costs
and benefits of a particular constitutional result, thus helping to address the con-
cerns of the prudential modality.254
Another leading constitutional scholar, Akhil Amar, has developed a richly
textured set of philosophical and social commitments that influence constitu-
tional interpretation.255 Amar argues that constitutional "text itself, when
properly approached, invites recourse to certain nontextual-unwritten-princi-
ples and practices."256 He writes that we should "read between the lines," under-
standing "the difference between reading the Constitution literally and reading
the documentfaithfully."257
Amar points to at least three interpretive influences that are relevant to
voices briefs. In Chapter Three ("Hearing the People") of America's Unwritten
Constitution, Amar recognizes the role of culture and evolving practice in con-
sidering "the constitutional status of textually unnamed or underspecified
rights." 258 He refers to a lived experience of liberty, recognizing that "judges
should pay and do pay close attention to how various rights are embodied in
citizens' daily rhythms and embedded in powerful customs."259 He closes the
chapter by suggesting that "what should ideally emerge is a genuine dialogue
among judges, legislators, and ordinary citizens. "260
Chapters Seven and Eleven also support a role for the lived experience of
the People. Chapter Seven recognizes feminism's legitimacy in constitutional
interpretation,261 and Chapter Eleven recognizes a role for judicial conscience
and humanity.262 Amar writes: "The success of our national constitutional project
253. Supra Bobbitt, note 252 at 12-13; BRIAN L. PORTO, THE CRAFT OF LEGAL REASONING 80-81
(1998).
254. In Obergefell, for example, voices briefs in support of marriage equality were offered to show
the costs of inequality to LGBT citizens, their families, and especially their children. Brief for Kristin M.
Perry, et. al., supra note 85; Brief of Ninety-Two Plaintiffs, supra note 92; Brief of the County of Cuya-
hoga, Ohio, supra note 90; Brief of PFLAG, Inc., supra note 45; Brief of Family Equality Council et. al.,
supra note 90; Brief of Marriage Equality USA, supra note 90.
255. "The take-home lesson of our story thus far is that sound constitutional interpretation involves
a dialogue between America's written Constitution and America's unwritten Constitution. The latter, at a
minimum, encompasses various principles implicit in the written document as a whole and/or present in
the historical background, forming part of the context against which we must construe the entire text....
Rather we have been exploring a variety of unwritten sources that intertwine with the written text-
sources such as ... preconstitutional and postconstitutional practices and precedents; principles and pur-
poses implicit in various patches of constitutional text; and . . . structural deductions from the constitu-
tional system viewed holistically." AMAR, supra note 236, at 19-20.
256. Id. at xiii.
257. Id. at 5.
258. Id. at 97.
259. Id. at 97.
260. Id. at 138.
261. Id. at 277-305.
262. Id. at 417-48.
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requires that certain things must always exist, and exist in abundance, in Amer-
ica. Virtue, honor, and conscience rank high among these essential elements."263
All this proof-texting should not be taken to mean that either Bobbitt or
Amar would support resolving a constitutional issue by storytelling. Bobbitt has
not addressed the role of narrative, and Amar is still, when all is said and done,
a "text-centric" originalist.264 The point here is that, in both Bobbitt's and Amar's
constitutional worlds, there is room for considering the lived experience of the
People. Voices briefs provide glimpses of that lived experience.
VII. LOOKING AHEAD
The use of voices briefs has increased dramatically in recent years, and we
have no reason to suspect that, absent Court intervention, that trend will abate.
As vehicles for expression, especially by marginalized groups, the briefs serve
important purposes. Their role in persuasion may even be necessary to respond
to the preexisting biases that afflict us all, including judges. Just one more pair
of questions remains: What legitimate concerns do voices briefs raise, and how
might we preserve their role while minimizing undeniable concerns?
A. Concerns
Despite the value of voices briefs generally, legitimate concerns do exist.
Voices briefs add to-the number of amicus filings before the Court, which con-
tinue to increase in the most controversial cases each term. 265 But while a large
number of amicus filings may engage judicial resources and complicate case
management, nothing unique to voices briefs distinguishes them on this basis.266
In fact, it is considerably easier to read and digest a voices brief than to read and
digest a brief making traditional legal arguments. Thus, any response to the in-
crease in amicus filings should not single out voices briefs.267
Three legitimate concerns do exist, however. The first is the question of re-
liability. Evidentiary rules establish a process for testing the reliability of adju-
dicative facts, but the rules of evidence do not help on appeal. As earlier sections
have shown, the value of non-party stories does not depend as much on careful
evidentiary accuracy as does the value of trial court evidence. Nonetheless, it is
disturbing to imagine an appellate process that might include a set of fictional
263. Id. at 419.
264. James Ryerson, 'America's Constitution': A Liberal Originalist, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/l l/06/books/review/americas-constitution-a-liberal-originalist.html (re-
viewing AMAR, supra note 236).
265. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
266. This observation is especially true since, most likely, a potential amicus filer precluded from
filing a voices brief simply would seek to file a more traditional brief.
267. While concern about the number of amicus filings is not particular to voices briefs, some of
the suggestions discussed in the following section might help reduce the number of amicus filings overall.
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stories masquerading as real, especially in recent months when "fake news" and
"alternative facts" have entered public discourse to an unprecedented egree.268
Rules of professional conduct offer only small comfort. Amicus briefs can
be filed only by an attorney admitted to practice before the Court,269 and rules of
professional conduct prohibit lawyers from knowingly making false statements
of fact to the Court.270 But the rule prohibits only "knowing" false statements, so
in theory, the lawyer's client might create fictional stories without the lawyer's
knowledge. And some lawyers do violate professional rules, especially if they
believe the odds of discovery to be slight.
Some risk does exist, then, but we must ask how great the risk might be.
Realistically, it seems unlikely that a lawyer, an organization, or a group of indi-
viduals would simply fabricate an entire set of stories claiming, for instance, to
have had an abortion when they did not.27' The more realistic concern is that
these storytellers may exaggerate or misstate their experience.
That risk is real, but it must be balanced against the realities of judicial de-
cision making. As we have seen, judges are already inevitably influenced by a
variety of background facts, many of which are completely untested and some of
which are expressly fictional. Social science information-the kind of infor-
mation that has been presented to the Court for over a century-may be no more
reliable than the stories in a voices brief.272 And judges rely expressly on a wide
variety of extra-record sources whose accuracy is untested-including internet
sites, magazines, experiments with video games, letters, and newspapers.273 They
also are influenced by their own experiences and those of family and friends, and
by the books they have read (including fiction) and the movies, television shows,
and documentaries they have seen.274 These extra-record sources and influences
largely are invisible to advocates and citizens and thus are immune from testing
268. James Carson, What Is Fake News? Its Origins and How It Grew in 2016, TELEGRAPH (Lon-
don) (Mar. 16, 2017), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/0/fake-news-origins-grew-2016/ (discuss-
ing the history and current status of "fake news"). Despite our current heightened sensitivity o false re-
ports, the stories in voices briefs should not be confused with false evidentiary reports, such as reports that
Barack Obama was not born in the United States. Michael D'Antonio, The Real Reason Trump Clings to
Birtherism, CNN (Sept. 16, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/10/opinions/why-trump-clings-to-
birtherism-dantonio/ (describing claims that Barack Obama was not born in the United States and is a
Muslim). In voices briefs, each person describes only her own personal experience with the issue presented
to the Court.
269. "An amicus curiae brief may be filed only by an attorney admitted to practice before this Court
as provided in Rule 5." Sup. Ct. R. 37(1).
270. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2017) (requiring candor toward
the tribunal).
271. It is unlikely that a group of lawyers, judges, students, and law clerks would falsely claim to
have had abortions. See Brief of MacAvoy et al., supra note 1. The Rules of Evidence have long recog-
nized such estimates of likelihood. For example, Federal Rule of Evidence 804 establishes dying declara-
tions as hearsay exceptions because, while not impossible, it is unlikely that a person who believes that
her death is imminent would lie.
272. See supra Part II.
273. See supra notes 121-133 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 141-160 and accompanying text.
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or refutation except by studies and stories that can broaden the Court's view of
the issue.
And it is broadening that we are talking about here, after all. A personal story
in a voices brief shares the experience of one person. It does not attempt to refute
the individual experience of someone else. It seeks only to show the Court that
there may be more to the matter than is apparent from the stories with which the
Court is already familiar. Each story finds its own small place within a wide
narrative sea already awash with many other stories. Each story is just one tiny
facet of a large, complex, and inevitable set of narrative influences.
Those other narrative influences include stories that circulate widely in the
culture, often with little factual basis.275 For example, consider this recent, widely
shared, anonymous Facebook meme: "It is wrong to tax a working person almost
to the breaking point, then give it to a person who is able to work but refuses to."
Two inaccurate cultural stories combine to produce that message: (1) the master
story that the financial distress of working people is caused by exorbitant taxes
(rather than by legislatures refusing to raise the minimum wage, employers ma-
nipulating working hours to avoid offering health care, or a myriad of other sys-
temic and personal causes); and (2) the master story that tax dollars are distrib-
uted routinely to people who could get a job but instead choose a life of leisure
on welfare.
The actual stories of individuals may be the only way to challenge these false
cultural stories. Certainly, advocates would want to offer social science studies
and statistics to disprove the stories, but, as Part IV has shown, statistics and
social science studies can operate to increase, not decrease, the influence of
preexisting cultural beliefs.276 Anecdotal messages uch as those in voices briefs
may be the best way to loosen the grip of preexisting values commitments.277
And after decades of voices briefs, to date we have no indication that the Justices
are confused about the nature of the stories, nor would we expect them to be.278
Given (a) the relatively low risk of complete fabrication, (b) the need for a
way to counter pre-existing bias, (c) the need for a way to counter inevitable
extra-record sources, (d) the ability of opposing parties to offer competing nar-
ratives, (e) the tiny role of any individual story compared to many others, and (f)
the sophistication of the judicial audience, the reliability risk is acceptable. None-
theless, as the next section describes, some steps can be taken to reduce reliability
concerns.
275. For a discussion of the role of master stories in law, see Linda H. Edwards, supra note 161, at
49-53.
276. See supra notes 189-192and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 193-197and accompanying text.
278. Even Justice Kennedy, if he was referring to the stories in Carhart, carefully qualified the
reference: "While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to con-
clude some women come to regret their choice . . . ." Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007).
These are not the words of a Justice who is confused about whether voices briefs constitute evidentiary
facts.
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The second concern is the question of relevance. The stories related in voices
briefs should not be offered simply to prompt a generalized emotional reaction
for or against a topic or practice. Rather, the stories should relate to the particular
issue the Court must decide. For example, in Whole Woman 's Health, the Texas
legislature had passed sweeping regulations purportedly aimed at protecting
women's physical health by raising the medical standards applicable to abortion
clinics.27 9 The new standards had caused the closure of over half the clinics in
the state. The issue for the Court was whether these regulations represented le-
gitimate medical requirements rather than a masked effort to make abortion less
available.280 Pro-life voices briefs offered stories describing psychological inju-
ries from abortion generally-stories completely unrelated to the medical prac-
tices at issue in the case.28 1 These stories raise relevance concerns, for voices
briefs should offer only stories that relate to the relevant legal issue. Thus, the
following section proposes a way to tighten the connection between the proffered
stories and the legal question at issue.
The third realistic concern is that non-party stories may actually be adjudi-
cative facts in disguise. No Supreme Court filer should use the appellate process
to smuggle new evidentiary facts into the record. For example, Whole Woman's
Health put directly at issue the evidentiary question of whether and to what ex-
tent the conditions in Texas abortion facilities raised legitimate health concerns.
Facts describing the conditions in those Texas clinics would seem to be eviden-
tiary facts. Yet, pro-life appellate briefs offered stories from Texas women relat-
ing substandard abortion practices in Texas.282 Those stories may overstep the
line between adjudicative facts and legislative facts. As the next section suggests,
the Court should increase scrutiny of any appellate brief that offers what may
amount to untested evidentiary facts.
Finally, the Court's own procedural rules complicate all three of these con-
cerns. Under the Court's rules, parties may and often do grant blanket consent to
the filing of amicus briefs,283 thus short-circuiting screening as part of the con-
sent process. But even in the absence of blanket consent, the Court's rules all but
preclude meaningful pre-filing screening. Rule 37(1) admonishes amicus filers
not to file briefs that duplicate the arguments made by the parties, but Rule
37(3)(a) requires that amicus briefs be filed within seven days after the filing of
the brief for the party supported. Thus, in theory, Rule 37 seems to contemplate
279. Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016).
280. Id.
281. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Priests for Life in Support of Respondents at 8-11, Whole
Woman's Health, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (No. 15-274).
282. Two briefs offered stories from Texas women who had abortions and from Texas abortion
providers describing their experiences with the facilities. Amicus Curiae Brief of Former Abortion Pro-
viders et al. in Support of Respondents app. at Al-12, BI-5, CI-8, Whole Woman's Health, 136 S. Ct.
2292 (No. 15-274); Amicus Curiae Brief of 3,348 Women Injured by Abortion and the Justice Foundation
in Support of Respondents for Affirmance, Whole Woman's Health, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (No. 15-274).
283. Sup. Ct. R. 37(3)(a).
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that a conscientious amicus filer would (1) write a draft of the brief and reserve
a spot with the printer despite not yet knowing whether the brief will be filed; (2)
await the filing of the party's brief and quickly read it; (3) decide whether the
proposed amicus arguments would be duplicative; (4) if not, seek consent from
all parties (including from the party whose attention is, at that point, focused with
laser-like precision on the newly filed opposing brief and on drafting its own
response);284 (5) receive consent from the parties; (6) have the brief printed;285
and (7) file the brief. Steps two through seven would have to be accomplished
within seven days. Even in less controversial cases, this timing is, practically
speaking, impossible. In controversial cases-the very cases in which voices
briefs are most likely to be filed-the large number of briefs seeking consent286
within that short window would exacerbate an already impossible situation.
Understandably, as a practical matter, this is not how amicus practice un-
folds. Amicus filers decide to file well before they know what the parties or any
other amici will argue. The rules simply do not permit filers to await the parties'
briefs to decide whether they have something new to say. Some amicus filers
subsequently work informally with the supported party, coordinating strategies.
Others do not. If no blanket consent has been given, filers seek individual consent
while their brief is being written. Parties generally consent without having time
to review the amicus brief for which consent is sought. Printing is arranged and
often accomplished nearly simultaneously with or shortly before the supported
party's brief is filed. Thus, under the Supreme Court's own rules and customary
Supreme Court practice, pre-filing screening by the opposing party-the party
with an incentive to screen-is essentially impossible.287
The practical impossibility of evaluating a proposed brief applies to all ami-
cus briefs, but the difficulties may be greater for voices briefs and briefs relying
on social science information. Briefs making traditional legal arguments may be
easier for the parties' lawyers to evaluate because they are already deeply im-
mersed in the applicable law. If they were to review the brief before consenting,
which generally they do not, they would at least be well versed in the legal argu-
ments. Voices briefs and social science briefs, however, may rely on sources that
are completely new to the parties and their lawyers-sources the lawyers have
little ability to evaluate under intense time pressure. Thus, appellate procedure
essentially precludes meaningful pre-filing screening either to enforce the non-
284. Consent sought before the filing of the party's brief would preclude the opposing party from
insisting on compliance with the "no-duplication" rule.
285. Because it is a significant expense, printing is unlikely to precede the decision to file.
286. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
287. This Article's scope does not include the question of whether the Court's non-duplication
standard is or can be effective, but the timing contemplated by Rule 37 is instructive on that question as
well. Rule 37's timing precludes careful compliance with the non-duplication standard by even a consci-
entious amicus filer. The timing requires an amicus filer to await the filing of the party's brief in order to
determine whether the amicus briefwould duplicate the party's arguments. The amicus filer then has seven
days in which to re-draft and file the amicus brief, all while seeking consent and allowing for three or four
days for printing.
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duplication standard or to test information for reliability, relevance, or legislative
fact.
Supreme Court rules create another procedural unfairness. Currently, amicus
filers supporting the respondent can rebut amicus briefs filed in support of the
petitioner, thus relieving the respondent from the need to use precious pages to
rebut an amicus brief. The petitioner, however, is the only participant capable of
responding to an amicus brief supporting the respondent because the only filing
opportunity remaining after pro-respondent amicus briefs are filed is the peti-
tioner's (short) 288 reply brief. 289
Whole Woman 's Health again serves as an example. Women Injured by
Abortion (WIA) had been an amicus filer in the Fifth Circuit and was expected
to be an amicus filer in the Supreme Court as well. In the Fifth Circuit, WIA's
amicus brief had related stories describing psychological injuries attributed to
abortion, making the implicit argument that abortion injures women's mental
health and therefore any regulations that limit abortion are valid protections of
women's health.29 0 Because the pro-choice argument was in the procedural po-
sition of the petitioner at the Supreme Court level, the only available way to rebut
those anticipated arguments without sacrificing space in the Petitioner's Reply
Brief was for a pro-choice amicus filer to cite to and rebut WIA's Fifth Circuit
amicus brief.291 Unanticipated pro-respondent amicus filings could not be rebut-
ted in this manner, however, and would therefore require space in the petitioner's
reply brief.
This section has recognized three legitimate concerns- reliability, rele-
vance, and the potential misuse of adjudicative facts-all of which are somewhat
exacerbated by the Court's procedural rules. But preserving a role for voices
briefs is preferable to limiting their use in ways that ignore modem cognitive
science and ancient rhetorical principles, that silence the voices of the governed,
or that secretly smuggle in the adoption of a limiting jurisprudential view. The
choice to preserve a role for voices briefs is bolstered by the possibility of adopt-
ing modest reforms that can reduce understandable concerns. The next section
proposes such reforms.
288. A word limit of 15,000 words applies to the petitioner's opening brief and the respondent's
responsive brief. The petitioner's reply brief, however, must not exceed 6,000 words. Sup. Ct. R.
33(1)(g)(v)-(vii).
289. The petitioner's reply brief is to be filed thirty days after the respondent's brief, and thus,
twenty-three days after the amicus briefs supporting the respondent. Sup. Ct. R. 25(3).
290. Brief of Women Injured by Abortion, Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir.
2015) (No. 14-50928).
291. Brief Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners for National Advocates for Pregnant Women et al.
at 27-30, Whole Woman's Health, 790 F.3d 563 (No. 14-50928).
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B. Preserving and Managing a Role for Voices Briefs
Voices briefs should be tested by asking three questions: Are the stories re-
liable enough? Are they relevant enough? Are they too relevant because they are
actually adjudicative facts?
1. Reliability
For reliability, legal process looks primarily for competence (the person
speaking is competent to make the statements) and accuracy (the statements are
likely to be accurate for their intended purposes). We seek only the degree of
reliability appropriate for the use to which the facts will be put. Currently, voices
briefs vary in their assurances of competence and accuracy. Some stories are told
by the person who experienced the events, while others are related by third par-
ties, including journalists and researchers with varying degrees of neutrality.
Some relate conclusions for which the speaker is the most competent source,
such as her own emotional reactions or the "who, what, when, and how" of par-
ticular events in her own life. Others offer expert conclusions the speaker seems
unqualified to make, such as the appropriateness of certain medical decisions or
matters of medical causation.
For assurance of accuracy, some amicus filers have provided stories in the
form of sworn affidavits. Others have taken the stories from some other pub-
lished source, ranging from sworn legislative testimony to social science studies,
to newspaper articles, to website postings, to letters sought by a partisan organi-
zation. Some have provided the parties and the Court with access to the original
versions of excerpted stories. For highly personal issues, some names are re-
dacted in public filings. All have cited to the original versions of the stories or
have explained the process by which the stories were gathered.
2. Relevance and Legislative Facts
Relevance on appeal requires the stories to be relevant enough (by relating
to the appropriate legal standard or policy argument) and not too relevant (by
being adjudicative facts masquerading as legislative facts). Most voices briefs
expressly explain the relationship between the proffered stories and the legal and
policy questions raised by the case, but voices briefs largely have not addressed
the question of whether the proffered stories qualify as legislative facts. As the
example from Whole Woman 's Health demonstrates,292 some briefs may have
trespassed beyond permissible uses of facts on appeal. Responsible use of non-
party stories on appeal should include an explanation of the basis for asserting
that the stories are not evidentiary facts in disguise.
292. Supra note 282.
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3. Suggested Improvements
Presently the Justices appear to manage amicus briefs by using their clerks
to sort briefs in chambers.293 A variety of additional strategies-some better than
others-could improve reliability and relevance, either by replacing the sorting
process or by improving it. For instance, the Court could toughen the consent
process with the goal of prohibiting questionable briefs. This approach is prob-
lematic for several reasons. It would significantly increase the Court's workload,
and depending on how stringently the Court approached requests for consent, the
approach might smack of prior restraint, silencing an appellate argument before
it can be made.294 It also would risk sparking internal arguments regarding which
sources and forms of argument some Justices would permit other Justices to hear.
Alternatively, the Court could impose post-filing sanctions when the Court
believed that a brief had transgressed reliability and relevance standards. Legal
sanctions might include striking the brief itself and/or assessing monetary fines
against the filer, the lawyer, or both. Striking the brief, however, would increase
the Court's workload. Simply ignoring the brief would be much easier than cre-
ating a process for decisions to strike that would result in significant disagree-
ments on the Court. The sanction would be difficult to implement as well, since
a triggering standard likely would be vague, at least in application.295 Sanctions
also might risk something akin to a chilling effect-discouraging speech offered
as part of a judicial proceeding out of concern about legal sanctions.296 Striking
the brief might have a less depressive effect than a fine, but the public humiliation
could still cause filers and their counsel to worry about judicial reaction to a brief
that uses strategies outside the customary variety, especially in light of the vague-
ness of the standard. Further, almost inevitably, the reach of post-filing sanctions
would be broader than the goal. Lawyers would surely want to build a hedge
293. Interviews with seventy Supreme Court law clerks refer to such a sorting role. "Nearly all
clerks (83%) skimmed or looked over every amicus brief filed," carefully reading only the briefs they
found to be useful. "One clerk described his personal system of screening amicus briefs as 'separating the
wheat from the chaff."' Lynch, supra note 60, at 43. The late Justice Scalia confirmed that he did not read
the amicus briefs as a general rule but ather asked his law clerks to read them and identify those of value.
Andrew Wolfson, Gay Marriage Court Briefs Both Wacky, Profound, USA TODAY (Apr. 14, 2015),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/04/14/gay-marriage-court-briefs-wacky-pro-
found/25762729/.
294. While the content of the brief could be disseminated to a broader audience in other ways, it
likely could not be communicated directly to the Justices themselves, and it is to the Justices that the
amicus filers wish to speak.
295. Professor Garcia has suggested using a standard similar to that created by Rule 11. Garcia,
supra note 78, at 349-52. Among other things, Rule II allows sanctions for knowingly signing litigation
documents (1) when presented for an improper purpose, such as to harass, cause delay, or increase litiga-
tion costs; (2) when the arguments are frivolous; or (3) when the facts lack evidentiary support. Id. That
standard has the virtue of familiarity in a trial court setting, but it has not been applied in an appellate
context. Developing precedent explaining the standard in the appellate setting would impose significant
new work on the Court.
296. "Chilling effect" is used here in its sense as an "emotive argument" rather than as a "substan-
tive component of first amendment adjudication." Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amend-
ment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 685 (1978).
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around the Torah in order to avoid the public humiliation and possible financial
consequence accompanying sanctions. Thus, sanctions would be either ineffec-
tual because seldom applied or too effectual, thus risking a depressive effect on
advocacy.
Three other less severe options exist, however, all functioning as supple-
ments to the Court's current sorting practice. In ascending order of change, the
Court could (1) publicize informal best practices for amicus briefs, especially on
matters of reliability and relevance; (2) amend the rules to require amicus briefs
to explain their reliability and relevance; or (3) amend the appellate timeline to
create a designated window to allow parties to reply to amicus briefs.
Promulgating a set of informal best practices is the easiest and the least re-
active. The Court could endorse a set of best practices and couple it with a mes-
sage indicating that briefs consistent with these practices likely would be consid-
ered more persuasive than briefs not in compliance. This approach avoids
concerns of prior restraint or speech-chilling, and it does not require amendments
to the rules. Nor does it increase the Court's current workload. It might result in
some immediate improvement in the quality of briefs, but it could also serve as
the first step of a gradual, measured approach to reform. After endorsing a set of
best practices, the Court could continue its internal sorting process and monitor
amicus briefing. The list of best practices could provide standards by which
briefs could be evaluated, either by the parties in the consent process, by parties
or other amicus filers in responsive briefs, or informally by the Court in its own
deliberations. Best practices, at least for voices briefs, might include the follow-
ing:
* Citing to the original sources. In the case of stories originally
gathered by an organization, the brief should explain fully the
gathering process and the instruments used.
* Providing electronic access to original sources. The brief could
provide the Court and the parties with electronic links as the
primary form of access, with CD-ROM or flash drive transfer
available on request.297
* Including names where possible. If the stories must be anony-
mous, an appendix should include a sworn affidavit explaining
297. The Supreme Court's style manual for its own opinions weighs in on the matter of online
materials. The manual:
strongly discourages citation of otherwise-unpublished online materials . .. because of their
corruptibility by hackers, natural disaster, technological obsolescence, and similar factors and
because of their transient nature. While the Court's opinions will be relied on as authority for
decades, even centuries, many of the materials posted on Internet Web sites are deleted within
days, weeks, or months after their inclusion. Entire online sites come and go with alarming
frequency, and sites regularly adopt entirely new Internet addresses (URLs).
OFFICE OF THE REPORTER OF DECISIONS, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SUPREME
COURT'S STYLE GUIDE § 0.2 (Jack Metzler ed., 2016).
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the need for anonymity and the manner of assurance of accu-
racy.
* Providing the public with hyperlink access to the original ver-
sions of the stories. These more public versions of the stories
could be redacted to preserve anonymity.
* Committing to maintain the hyperlink on a website for a set
period of time, perhaps ten years, in order to minimize link
rot.2 9 8
* Providing the stories in the words of the individual herself,
where possible, rather than in language crafted by a lawyer, the
amicus filer, or another third party.
* Including in the briefa section explaining the stories' relevance
to the legal standard or policy argument at issue.
* Including in the brief a section explaining why the proffered
stories are legitimately considered legislative facts rather than
adjudicative facts.
Second, moving beyond an informal list of best practices, the Court could
require amicus briefs to include a formal section explaining (a) the degree of
reliability of their non-legal information; (b) the information's relevance to the
legal issue; and (c) the information's legitimate status as legislative fact. Simply
drafting such a section would focus the brief-writer's attention on these concerns
and likely would result in some improvement. It also would focus attention in
chambers on whether the assertions in that section of the brief were accurate.
This approach would require a rule amendment and might thus require more ef-
fort than the Court would like to invest at this point. But after a few years of
working with a set of best practices, this approach could offer a potentially pro-
ductive second step.
Third, instead of tightening the consent process, the Court could amend the
rules to allow the parties (and only the parties) time to file a short reply to amicus
briefs (one brief per party, not one brief per amicus brief). The reply could re-
spond particularly to matters of reliability and relevance. This approach would
have the advantage of placing most of the enforcement responsibility on the par-
ties rather than on the Court and of assisting the in-chambers sorting process.
While the reply brief would add some work in chambers, it would be relatively
easy to read and digest. Work in chambers need not await the filing of the reply,
so there would be little to no delay.
Amending the appellate timeline could bring another benefit. The newly
amended rule could slightly increase the time allowed for filing amicus briefs.
298. Id. "Link rot" is the tendency of websites to be abandoned or removed, so the information
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The goal would be to permit meaningful attention to the Court's no-duplication
standard. Proposed amicus filers could be required to provide their proposed
brief to the parties as part of the consent process. They might even be required
to include a statement of what their brief would add to the briefs of the parties.
The simple requirement of articulating and applying the non-duplication stand-
ard might improve compliance by amicus filers, even if parties continue to grant
consent freely. To accomplish that goal, filing deadlines would need to change.
Amicus filers would need additional time to examine the supported party's brief,
to finalize their own brief, and to seek consent to file.
If the rules are amended in one of these forms, the implicit procedural dis-
advantage to petitioners discussed above299 could be resolved as well. Allowing
the parties to file simultaneous short replies to all amicus arguments as a last step
in the briefing process would allow the petitioner to respond without using space
in its reply brief, thus placing the parties on more even procedural footing.
These three approaches balance a number of important goals. They would
maintain the parties' control over their own litigation while recognizing the le-
gitimate interests of non-parties. They would maintain a level playing field and
preserve the rights of others to craft their own appellate arguments without the
depressive effect of pre-filing hurdles or post-filing sanctions. They would con-
serve judicial resources and avoid needlessly increasing litigation costs. Most
important, they would preserve a legitimate role for voices briefs while improv-
ing the briefs' reliability and relevance.
CONCLUSION
On deeply personal constitutional issues, voices briefs are increasingly com-
mon, accounting for more than ten percent of the amicus briefs in Obergefell v.
HodgeS300 and over twenty percent of the amicus briefs in Whole Woman 's
Health.3 01 These briefs tell non-party stories on appeal without the benefit of any
evidentiary testing, a potentially troubling practice. Because they were rare in
earlier years, they have been the subject of little comment and no analysis to date.
Given their dramatically increased use in the last three years, however, the time
has come to examine the practice and begin to draw some conclusions.
This Article has begun that analysis. We have seen that voices briefs do not
run afoul of any legal requirements, and they fulfill most of the recognized roles
long served by other kinds of amicus briefs. In fact, surprisingly, they are far less
different from traditional policy briefs than one might initially assume. They are
299. Supra notes 288-291 and accompanying text.
300. A total of 144 amicus briefs were filed in Obergefell, see supra note 25, and 16 of them were
voices briefs, see supra note 13.
301. A total of 80 amicus briefs were filed in Whole Woman's Health, see Whole Woman's Health
v. Hellerstedt, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/whole-womans-health-v-
cole/, and 17 of them were voices briefs, see supra note 15.
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at least as reliable as some other sources on which the Court increasingly relies.
And because voices briefs are publicly submitted, unlike many of the web-based
sources the Court now consults, the parties can respond to them rather than being
blind-sided by them.
On a theoretical level, voices briefs are consistent with the overall policies
behind procedural rules and forms of legal reasoning; with major schools of ju-
risprudence; and with major philosophies of constitutional interpretation. Fur-
ther, in light of modem cognitive studies, they may be the only form of persua-
sion that can address the problem of preexisting bias. In fact, when an argument
threatens an important preexisting value held by a judge, the stories in voices
briefs may be one of the only ways to encourage that judge to engage in a rigor-
ous traditional legal analysis. Voices briefs permit an appropriate amount of
democratic involvement in cases that will govern the lives of parties and non-
parties alike. Finally, even if a voices brief stands little chance of affecting the
Court's decision on the merits, it can and should affect the Court's tone and atti-
tude toward the losing side.
Voices briefs are not worry-free, however. They raise concerns about relia-
bility, relevance, and the role of legislative facts on appeal. To address all of
these concerns, the Article identifies three possible strategies. These strategies
comprise a spectrum of judicial responses ranging from a gradual informal re-
sponse to a more significant formal response. All of them, however, aim to pre-
serve a role for voices briefs in constitutional deliberation.
Why? Because in addition to all the reasons listed above, voices briefs offer
a chance for the Court and for all of us to engage in rhetorical listening-a fem-
inist concept often ignored in theorizing about constitutional deliberation.302
Rhetorical listening is the primary way we can reach beyond our own limiting
frames and better understand both ourselves and each other. Voices briefs can be
a vehicle for that much-needed understanding.
302. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
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Telling Stories in the Supreme Court: Appendix A
Voices Briefs Filed to Date
1986 Thornburgh v. Pro-Choice National Abortion Rights Ac-
Am. Coll. of Ob- tion League et al.
stetricians & Gy- 1985 WL 669630
necologists
1989 Webster v. Repro- Pro-Choice Women Who Have Had Abor-
ductive Health tions and Friends of Amici Cu-
Servs. riae
1989 WL 1115239
Pro-Life Feminists for Life of America et
al.
1989 WL 1115184
2006 Gonzales v. Car- Pro-Life Sandra Cano, the Former "Mary
hart Doe" of Doe v. Bolton, and 180
Women Injured by Abortion
2006 WL 1436684
2012 Nat'l Fed'n of In- Anti- Project Liberty





Pro- Asian & Pacific Islander Amer-
Obamacare ican Health Forum et al.
2012 WL 549231
National Women's Law Center
et al.
2012 WL 160240
2012 United States v. Pro-Mar- Family Equality Council et al.
Windsor riage Equal- 2013 WL 4737186
ity
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2012 Kiobel v. Royal Interna- Eleven Jewish Former Resi-
Dutch Petroleum tional law dents of Iran Whose Family
Co. claims in Members "Disappeared"
U.S. courts 2012 WL 2165351
2015 Obergefell v. Pro-Mar- Survivors of Sexual Orientation
Hodges riage Equal- Change Therapies
ity 2015 WL 1021452
Kristin M. Perry et al.
2015 WL 1048444
Ninety-Two Plaintiffs in Mar-
riage Cases
2015 WL 1022702










Mattachine Society of Washing-
ton, D.C.
2015 WL 1048438
Anti-Mar- Organizations That Promote Bi-
riage Equal- ological Parenting
ity 2015 WL 1569761




Speakers, and Scholars Con-
cerned About Free Speech
2015 WL 1534343
Parents and Friends of Ex-Gays
& Gays
2015 WL 1501659
Robert Oscar Lopez and B.M.
Klein
2015 WL 1519053
Heather Barwick and Katy
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Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
Faust
2015 WL 1534345
Dawn Stefanowicz and Denise
Shick
2015 WL 1519047
2016 Little Sisters of the Anti- Residents and Families of Resi-
Poor Home for the Obamacare dents at Homes of the Little Sis-
Aged v. Burwell (challenging ters of the Poor
contracep- 2016 WL 183800
tive cover-
age)
2016 Whole Woman's Pro-Choice Kate Banfield et al.
Health v. Heller- 2015 WL 9610343
stedt National Advocates for Preg-






Honorable Wendy Davis et al.
2016 WL 93992









of America et al.
2016 WL 74963
National Latina Institute for Re-
productive Health et al.
2016 WL 106619
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Former Abortion Providers et
al.
2016 WL 355060

